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PREFACE
Tax and transfer policies are an important part of the context in
which individuals and families make decisions about the nature
and extent of their participation in the labour market. Decisions
about whether one or both individuals in a couple will seek paid
employment, hours of work, or the balance of advantage between
acceptance of a job offer and continued search for a better job, can
be significantly affected by taxes and transfers. Changes in labour
market behaviour are sometimes the primary aim of a particular
tax or welfare reform; in other cases, the main aim may be a
different one, but the consequences for labour market behaviour
may be central to an overall evaluation of the impact of a
proposed reform.
Questions about the impact of policy changes on labour market
behaviour have been of concern in many countries, and have
motivated a great deal of highly focused research on the topic. As
a result, methods for analysing the impact of tax and transfer
policy changes on labour market behaviour have continued to
advance rapidly in recent years. In order to learn from these recent
advances, a conference was convened at the Economic and Social
Research Institute in December 1998, at which drafts of the papers
gathered together in this volume were first presented. This
represents the first stage of a project ultimately aimed at producing
the technical tools to undertake such an analysis in an Irish
context.
The paper by Robert Moffitt stresses the key role of
microsimulation models, operating at the level at which actual
decisions are taken rather than some more aggregate level. Moffitt
shows clearly the steps involved in designing and estimating a
model which is capable of analysing the impact of possible
changes to US policies towards lone mothers. One element of the
model is that it simplifies the labour market choices facing lone
mothers into three possibilities: full-time work, part-time work and
remaining outside the paid labour force. One key factor which is
taken into account is that benefits such as Aid for Dependent
Children (AFDC), Food Stamps and subsidized housing are not
always taken up by those who are entitled to them.
The paper by John Creedy and Alan Duncan provides a
technical survey of recent developments in behavioural
microsimulation. They discuss the criteria by which models of
labour supply may be chosen in this context. They conclude that
an approach based on estimation of what is termed a structural
discrete choice model of labour supply offers the greatest
potential. Such models attempt to identify the underlying
preferences guiding individual or family choices in the labour
market, but simplify these choices to a limited set of hours points.
The recent change in the UK to a Working Families Tax Credit,
replacing Family Credit, is examined in order to illustrate the value
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of such an approach. The change can be summarised as a more
generous version of Family Credit (with increased payments and a
reduction in the "benefit withdrawal rate" or taper), coupled with a
change in the payment mechanism. The results show that higher
participation in employment is likely for one parent families, but
finds that a significant number of women married to low earning
men would be likely to withdraw from the labour force. The net
financial gain from their continued employment would be reduced
because of the ’more generous income support available under
WFTC if they were to withdraw from employment.
Arthur van Soest and Marcel Das also adopt a structural discrete
choice approach to the modelling of labour supply in their paper,
building on earlier work such as Van Soest (1995). Their model
takes into account fixed costs of working, and variation in
preferences across households. The model is designed to examine
the potential impact of proposed tax reforms in the Netherlands on
the labour supply of married or cohabiting couples. Simulation of
one structural reform revealed that while the macroeconomic
objective of stimulating increased labour supply would be met,
there could be negative labour supply consequences for a
significant sub-group. Women with low earnings working part-time
might find the net reward from employment reduced to such an
extent that they would withdraw from the paid labour market. This
could have undesired consequences for sectors of the labour
market (e.g., home care work in the health sector) in which such
workers are strongly represented.
Callan, Doris and Nolan set out the context for estimation and
simulation of labour supply responses to tax and welfare changes
in Ireland. In the not-so-distant past, the predominant concerns
were about high levels of unemployment and outward migration.
More recently new concerns have emerged about meeting labour
shortages through increased labour supply and/or immigration. But
an understanding of the nature of labour market responses to tax
and welfare policy changes remains a pressing issue. Building a
framework in which labour supply responses to tax and welfare
changes can be simulated is a complex task, as shown by the
papers gathered here. Strategic simplifications are essential to
make the task a feasible one: the most central of these is to
estimate preferences over a limited set of hours options. Essential
building blocks include an ability to model the consequences of
alternative labour market choices for the disposable incomes of
individuals and families. The experience gained in building
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, which examines the "cash"
or "first-round" effect on incomes of changes in tax and welfare
policy, provides a sound basis for the production of this element
of a broader model. Given the groundwork that has been done, it
is now possible to make further progress towards models which
can quantify the labour market impact of changes in Irish tax and
transfer policy.
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1. SIMLEATING TRANSFER
PROGRAMMES AND IABOUR
SUPPLY*
Robert A. Moffitt
1.1
Introduction
Microsimulation is a powerful policy tool which has become
indispensable in the calculation of the effects of reforms of the tax
and transfer system in the US. The use of such models began in
the 1960s, when policy research on social issues became a major
activity of social scientists and policy analysts, and has grown
steadily since that time. Today, dozens of microsimulation models
are in use in the US. Most of the models have a particular area of
policy focus - either transfer programmes for the poor, retirement
and medical programmes for the aged, or tax systems, for
example, although there are one or two that attempt to be
completely general. Government agencies routinely call upon
research organisations to perform microsimulations of policies they
have proposed or are considering, in order to learn their effects on
individuals and families as well as their effects on costs (Citro and
Hanushek, 1991; Haveman and Hollenbeck, 1980). As stated by
Citro and Hanushek (1991) in a recent report on the uses of
microsimulation modelling:
The microsimulation model approach to producing
estimates of the effects of proposed changes in government
programmes involves obtaining inputs from microlevel
databases of individual records, mimicking how current and
alternative programme provisions apply to the individuals
described in those records, and maintaining the simulated
outputs for each programme scenario on each of the
individual records (p.8).
* This paper is a revised version of one prepared for The Economic and Social
Research Institute Conference on "Estimation and Simulation of Behavioural
Response to Tax and Transfer Programmes", Dublin, Ireland, December 11, 1998.
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Unlike back-of-the-envelope estimation, aggregate forecasting, or
spreadsheet modelling, microsimulation modelling operates at the
individual, or micro level, where the actual decisions are made.
Aside from generating estimates that may be, therefore, more
accurate in general, microsimulation modelling has two other
advantages over these other types of policy tools: (1) it can show
the actual distribution of impacts of policies across different types
of individuals, as well as the distribution of costs and benefits
across those types, and (2) it can capture the complex interactions
between different programmes, and between programme rules and
individual characteristics, that naturally arise from the operation of
real-world policy programmes.
Many microsimulation models are, in essence, simply glorified
accounting models. An accounting model is one which simply
counts up the changes in income or costs from a policy change,
taking all the other characteristics of the individuals as fixed and
unchanged. The phrase "simply" is used guardedly here, for
conducting this accounting exercise correctly can be very complex
and require great skill and judgement, given the complexity of
government programmes combined with the difficulties in
operationalising those programme rules in the data sets that are
generally available - which usually do not have all the variables
needed to implement the rules in their exact detail. Nevertheless,
the research community is in general agreement that accounting
models have the significant deficiency of ignoring what is
generally termed "behavioural response". Behavioural responses
occur when individuals respond to changes in programmes by
altering their behaviour of one type or another. Perhaps the most
common type of response is in work behaviour, or what
economists term labour supply. Some programmes for the poor
lead some individuals to reduce their labour supply, while other
prograrmnes give individuals an incentive to work more. Not only
is this inherently something that policy makers should want to
know, but the magnitude of such responses will inevitably affect
costs as well. Another, perhaps more basic example is the
behavioural response in the form of take-up - making programmes
more generous will lead to higher rates of take-up, generally,
which leads to a higher caseload and higher costs.
This paper offers one example of a model that specifies and
estimates the labour supply response of lone mothers to changes
in US welfare progrmmnes, and simulates the effect of a number of
reforms in those programmes on their labour supply. The model
was developed by Keane and Moffitt (1998). Although it is just one
example, it illustrates many of the technical issues that are
involved in conducting the estimation and simulation necessary to
gauge the effects of policy reforms. This paper also comments on
the issues that surround this particular model, the decisions that
were made in specifying it, and alternative decisions that might
have been made. Finally, the paper discusses extensions of the
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1.2
Some General
Issues in
Micro-
simulation
model to issues concerning "dynamics" of programme participation
and labour supply.
Microsimulation models are constructed from (1) a data base
with information on individuals and their characteristics, and (2) a
set of equations that apply to those individuals. Each equation
describes how a particular behavioural response - labour supply,
programme participation, or whatever is assumed to be
determined. The determining variables in those equations include:
(a) variables that describe the characteristics of each individual
0ncome, age, education, etc.); (b) variables that describe the
features of the policy programmes under examination (eligibility
and benefit rules, etc.); and (c) a set of "parameters", or regression
coefficients, that describe how individuals differ according to their
individual characteristics and, more importantly, how they respond
to changes in programme features and rules.
There are nlany issues concerning the first component - the
data set - that will not be pursued or discussed in detail here. Most
household survey data sets often miss the detailed asset and
household structure variables needed to represent programme
eligibility and potential benefits completely accurately, for
example, and often income is in the wrong time unit (e.g., annual
instead of monthly) for prograrame evaluation purposes. When
administrative data from programme participants are used, there is
the additional problem of not having information on those who are
not in receipt of benefits. Considerable effort and judgement is
needed to address and resolve the data difficulties of this type.
Indeed, a US National Academy of Sciences report (Citro and
Hanushek, 1991) concluded that data deficiencies were one of the
major problems with microsimulation models in the US, and
recommended major new investments of resources in data
collection to help remedy those deficiencies.
Most research attention has instead focused on the second
element of microsimulation models - the equations - and, in
particular, on the choice of paranleters in the equations of the
model. Choosing the parameters of the equations is known in the
microsimulation literature as "calibrating" the model.’ There are
two generic approaches to the problem of calibrating a model. The
first is to specify a single model composed of a set of internally
consistent equations describing behaviour, to find a suitable data
set upon which those equations can be jointly estimated, to
estimate the model on that data set, and then to simulate outcomes
from that same data set using the set of equations estimated. This
is the approach described below with the Keane-Moffitt model.
The second approach is to select parameters which have already
~The term "calibration" has come into more recent use in academic research on
macroeconomic models to describe a related exercise of assigning parameter
values to fairly stylised models of the entire economy.
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been estimated in past research in the literature, usually from a set
of different research studies, and simply to insert those values of
the estimated parameters from past work into the equations that
have been specified for the microsimulation model. Often the data
sets used in the studies from which the estimates are drawn differ
from the data set used for the microsimulation model as well.
The second approach is more problematic from a statistical
point of view because drawing parameter estimates from different
studies may result in estimates that are not fully consistent with
one another. Another difficulty is that the relationships between
the estimated parameters in different studies - namely, the
covariances - are not available, by definition, since the parameters
were not estimated from a common data set and as part of the
same model.2 Applying a set of parameters estimated from one
data set to a different data set also requires some care to ensure
that the parameters are consistent with the distribution of the
outcome variables in the latter. Despite the drawbacks to this
approach, it is often employed nevertheless because frequently the
microsimulation models needed to simulate a particular type of
policy outcome or programme are extremely difficult to estimate
beforehand, either because the number of parameters is
exceedingly large or because the equations are sufficiently
complex as to make estimation infeasible. In addition, often there
is not a single data set which has all the variables needed to
estimate a model. In these cases, drawing parameters from
multiple studies is needed. The problems just noted must therefore
be addressed.3
Finally, a major issue in microsimulation models concerns
conveying their uncertainty to policy makers. Policy makers in the
US tend to prefer single "best" estimates of policy effects and are
often not comfortable with estimates that are presented in the form
of a range, such as that generated by a confidence interval.
Generating confidence intervals on microsimulation output is
relatively straightforward if the model is calibrated to a single
previously estimated model, as described above.4 When the model
is calibrated to multiple prior estimates, generating standard errors
2 Consequently, implicit independence assumptions are usually made. See Sims
(1972) for an early statement of this problem.
The process of calibrating a model to multiple prior research studies involves the
exercise of "validation" of the model, which means checking its accuracy and
reliability (in terms of some metric) after parameter values are assigned. The
National Academy of Sciences referred to earlier (Citro and Hanushek, 1991)
regarded poor and inadequate validation of microsimulation models - especially as
regards their ability to track historical trends - as the second main deficiency of
microsimulation models in the US (the first being deficiencies in the underlying
data).
* Even here, however, most microsimulation models do not add in the sampling
error in the underlying data set. The models thus fail to capture the error in
estimating aggregates for the true total population that arise because only a sample
of that population is used for simulation.
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on predictions requires assumptions on the covariances of the
parameters. However, these methods of incorporating uncertainty
only deal with the uncertainty in the estimated parameters, and not
with the specification error in the model itself that is surely also
present. Indeed, some microsimulation modellers believe that
model specification error is much more of a problem than
parameter uncertainty. This explains why modellers typically
spend quite a bit of time testing the sensitivity of their simulated
outcomes to the specification of the form of the equations; to the
assumptions on the error terms; to how variables are defined and
which are included; to non-linearities, and to dozens of other
assumptions and decisions that are made in setting up the model
in the first place. There is no rigorous scientific or statistical
formula for this type of sensitivity testing, and it therefore requires
considerable expertise and judgement in modelling, estimation,
and simulation to be done well.
1.3
Simulating the
Static Labour
Supply
Response to
Transfer
Programmes
The theory, estimation, and simulation of labour supply subject
to taxes and transfers is well developed (see Blundell and
MaCurdy, forthcoming, for a recent review). The basic theory upon
which static labour supply models are grounded assumes that
individual work effort is primarily influenced by two variables -
the afte>tax, or net, hourly wage rate, and the income available to
the individual if he or she does not work. The latter includes
transfer-programme payments, income available from other family
members, and income from past savings. The (utility-compensated)
effect of net wages on labour supply is expected to be positive
while that of unearned income is expected to be negative. There
are many important issues that have been discussed in this
literature concerning the influence of childcare if children are
present, how the decisions within families are made by multiple
family members, and so on. The most difficult issue from the
standpoint of microsimulation, however, is how to deal with
constraints from the demand side of the labour market, namely,
those which result in restrictions on the types of jobs and the
hours worked offered by the labour market, and the problem of
involuntary unemployment. How the model addresses these issues
has a significant influence on how responsive individuals are
assumed to be to changes in the net wages and incomes which are
available to them.
In addition, there is one analytic, or technical, difficulty that has
received enormous attention in the estimation and simulation of
labour supply responses to tax and transfer programmes, and that
is the problem of having piecewise-linear, or "kinked," budget
constraints (see Hausman, 1985, Moffitt, 1986, and the other
papers in this symposium). Most tax and transfer schedules are
highly non-linear. Most income tax rates in advanced industrialised
countries are reasonably progressive and contain a number of
exemptions, deductions, and special provisions that create kinks,
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notches, and other non-linearities in the constraint, for example. In
addition, all transfer programmes which are income-conditioned
create, at mininmm, one non-linear non-convex kink and hence
one major form of non-linearity at the point of eligibility. Also,
most transfer prograrmnes have, like tax programmes, other
aspects of the benefit formula which create additional kinks and
notches and other non-linearities.5
The difficulW that these kinks, notches, and brackets create is
that they make the labour supply function itself highly non-linear.
Changes in progratmlle parameters may result in changes in net
wage rates in some ranges of earnings and not in others, and by
very different amounts in different ranges. Some individuals may
not respond at all to programme parameter changes in ranges
irrelevant to their behaviour while others will respond by a great
deal.
This problem was first confronted by Burtless and Hausman
(1978) and Hausman (1981) for the case of US transfer
progmmmes and income taxation, using a formal structural labour
supply model using continuous hours of work and treating the
piecewise-linear budget constraint in a fair amount of detail. The
general method was used in a number of other studies (see
Hausman, 1985 and Moffitt, 1986 for reviews of this approach).
The approach has by now been well worked out in principle,
although a variety of computational and practical difficulties with
implementing it still remain.
One of those difficulties arises when the number of segments,
kinks, and notches is reasonably large in number. Indeed, in most
applications this has turned out to be the rule rather than
exception, particularly if the tax system is incorporated, for tax
systems usually have a fairly large number of segments and
brackets and special features. Implementation of the general
method of handling piecewise-linear budget constraints in that
case is computationally very burdensome because of the
complexity of the constraint. The solution to this practical problem
that has been developed in the literature is to shift away from
treatment of continuous hours of work (say, per week) to the
choice to discrete hours of work choice, for example, the choice of
full-time versus part-time, and the choice of not working at all.
This approach simplifies the problem by requiring that the budget
constraint opportunities facing the individual only be computed,
and evaluated, at a small number of points (e.g., only three in the
full-time/part-time/non-work example) and hence makes the
approach much more feasible. The discrete-hours approach was
first applied (to this author’s knowledge) by Zabalza et al. (1980)
(see also Moffitt (1984) for an early application in a non-tax
context). It has since been applied many times and has proven to
5 Not all countries have highly progressive schedules, and in these countries these
problems can be argued to be circumvented. Blundell (1993) argues that the UK is
one such country.
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be flexible in estimation as well as capable of capturing labour
supply responses. The Keane-Moffitt model below takes this
approach (see also van Soest (1995)))
The discrete-hours approach is popular among some analysts
for the additional reason that it can be argued to more accurately
capture the restrictions that the job market offers workers in terms
of hours of work. Most male workers work at full-time jobs and
would have difficulty finding part-time work at the same wage rate
and fringe benefits. Even female workers, who work part-time
more often, often work full-time in larger numbers. Some analysts
argue, however, that rather than simply assuming only (say) three
choices to be available, it is better to model the problem more
directly. For example, one could assume that jobs are available at
all hours points, but that part-time jobs have lower wage rates and
fringe benefits, thereby implying that few workers will choose
them. Alternatively, one could assume that there are only a finite
number of part-time jobs available, and there is a queue to get
them. Unfortunately, directly modelling these features of the labour
market is not simple, and the assumption of a discrete hours
choice can be viewed as a simplifying assumption to capture some
realism without making the model too complex and difficult to
estimate.7
In addition to the problem of piecewise-linear budget
constraints, there is a second modelling problem in the literature
on labour supply and transfer programmes related to the problem
of take-up, or participation. Participation rates among eligibles for
transfer programmes are almost never 100 per cent, although they
vaW tremendously from countW to countw and from programme
to programme and are, in a few cases, relatively high. There have
been many reasons adduced for such non-participation. One is that
welfare receipt is stigmatising, and individuals will often prefer to
stay off welfare, even at a lower level of income, than become
welfare recipients (Moffitt, 1983). Another explanation is that it
takes time and money to apply for welfare, and to maintain
compliance with the rules of the programme. These may be
termed as fixed costs of participating. Another, rather different,
explanation is that individuals who do not participate even when
eligible are investing in their human capital off the programme -
that is, gaining work experience. Even though income may be
6 Some authors have argued that the discrete-hours approach circumvents the
coherency problems noted by MaCurdy et al. (1990). This is not correct to the
extent that global concavity solves the coherency problem, for in the absence of
global concavity similar problems can arise even in the discrete-hours approach.
7 The difference in views shows up as well in whether one simulates continuous
hours choice or discrete hours choice. If the use of a discrete hours model is made
only for computational convenience for estimation (as opposed to simulation)
then, after estimating the model, one could simulate a continuous hours choice.
But if the discrete hours model is used because it is thought to actually better
represent the labour market, then one should simulate a discrete hours outcome as
well. See the paper by Creedy and Duncan in this volume for a discussion.
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reduced in the short run by not going on welfare, income in the
long run is improved, in this argument, from the investment in
labour market skills. This explanation does require that there
should be sonle reason that the individual does not work at the
same time as being on welfare, however. Yet another explanation
for non-participation is that the data are inadequate, and are
incapable of correctly measuring eligibility. Most studies show that,
while this is a factor, it is not the complete explanation.
The Keane-Moffitt model described below attempts to address
this issue by positing that welfare participation is a utility-
maximising choice but one for which there may be fixed costs,
possibly arising from stigma, that may prevent participation. The
potential income gain from being on welfare is still a factor in the
participation choice, but not the only one. The model implies that
higher benefits or a more generous programme will still increase
take-up, because more eligibles will find that the income gain
outweighs the negative aspects of welfare participation. But there
will still be participation rates less than 100 per cent among
eligibles.
1.4
The Keane-
Moffitt Model:
Specification
and
Estimation
The Keane-Moffitt (KM) model, as already noted, is a discrete-
hours model, treating the choice problem as a multinomial utility-
maximising choice from among the discrete points in the choice
space. In addition, the KM model addresses the participation
decision as a decision related to labour supply choice, but
somewhat independent as well. Labour supply choice does not
automatically imply a participation choice. Consequently,
participation in a transfer programme becomes a choice variable.
There is thus an extra equation needed for participation, in
addition to that for labour supply.
The KM model goes one step further than this by permitting
multiple transfer programmes for which the individual (or family)
is potentially eligible. There are in reality many different transfer
programmes in most developed countries. The KM model allows
each of M programmes to each base its payment to a recipient on
a particular "guarantee" amount - the payment to a family with no
earnings and no income from any other transfer programme - and
on a set of tax rates (or benefit-reduction rates, as they are
sometimes called) which denote the amount by which the
payment is reduced for each extra dollar of income. That income
may arise from earnings, or from non-transfer unearned income, or
from benefits from other transfer programmes. The latter implies
that there will be programme interaction because a change in the
benefit formula in one programme will affect benefit levels for its
recipients, but this will also affect benefit levels received by
individuals participating in other programmes. Also, an increase in
earnings or other forms of income will change the benefits in
multiple progranmles in complex ways - both directly, through the
tax rate in each programme, and indirectly, through changes in the
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benefits in other programmes which are counted as income in
each programme.
Denote the utility function as U(H,Y,PbP2 .....Pro) where Pm is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual participates in
programme m and 0 if not. The presence of participation
indicators in the preference function can be interpreted as
representing either stigma influences or, more generally, as costs
of participation (neither money nor time costs are directly
measured in most data sets). Assume 0U/0H <0, and
OUIOY > 0, and OUIOP < 0. In the separable case, we have
M
U(H,r,Pf2,...Pm)=g(H,r)- z %Pro (1)
m=l
where each tPm denotes the marginal disutility of participating in
programme m. Thus if ~m is sufficiently large, a particular
programme may not be chosen even though participation
increases O.
The KM model considers three hours points, H=O, H=20, and
H=40 per week, taken as the choice of non-work, part-time work,
and full-time work, respectively. Extensions to greater number of
points can and have been made in other articles in this literature.
With three H points and M transfer programmes there are
3*2Mdiscrete choices available to the individual. The budget
constraint gives disposable income for each m
M
Y(H,PbP2 .....Pra)= wH + N + Z PmBm(H)- T(H)
m=l
(2)
where w is the hourly wage rate, N is non-transfer non-labour
income, BmH is the benefit function for programme m, and T(H) is
the positive tax function. For notational simplicity we have
suppressed the dependence of the functionsBm// and T(H) on N,
wH, and the benefits of other transfer programmes in which the
individual might participate (as well as individual and family
characteristics that may affect taxes or transfers).
Letting j = 1,..,3" 2g index alternatives from the choice set, the
choice problem is
Choose alternative j/ff Uj _> Uk V k = 1 .....3" 2M (3)
where Uj denotes the evaluation of (1) for combination j obtained
by inserting (2) evaluated at that combination into (1) and by
setting H and the P= at their appropriate values for combination j.
KM considered the choice of single mothers in the US from among
three different programmes - Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), Food Stamps, and subsidised housing, although
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set m=A for AFDC, m=F for Food Stamps, and m=R for subsidised
(rental) housing. With three categories of H the number of
alternatives is 24. For the utility function in (1) above, KM assume
a conventional flexible-form, quadratic function representing a
second-order Taylor series expansion in its arguments
U(H,Y, PI,P2 ..... Pm )= C~I + Y- ~HHH2 --
M M M
~n.Y2- Y. WraP,,
, 
+ Z Z ~,,.,PmP,, +t~m.HY-
m=l m=l nT>Di
M M
Z 8,,,HP, n- Z rlmYPm
m=l               m=l
(4)
The marginal utility of Y at Y=O is normalised to 1; the remaining
parameters are therefore in dollar terms. Interactions between the
different participation prograrmnes (Ore,)were allowed although
most were estimated to be insignificant. The multinomial choice
model therefore consists of (4) and (2), with solution (3).
The stochastic structure posited by KM permits 0~ and the tI"
to vaW in the population conditional on a set of observable socio-
economic characteristics
a = x’a+s,~ (5)
ee,,, = X’ W m + e .... m = A,F, or R (6)
where X is a vector of characteristics and E and ~,, are vectors
of coefficients. The parameter ~z represents the marginal disutility
of work at H=O, and the parameters Wm represent the marginal
disutilities, or costs, of programme participation if there are no
higher-order interactions in the preference function.
The full model can be derived by inserting (2), (5), and the
three equations in (6) into (4). There are 24 possible combinations
of the choice variables, and hence 24 "equations", and there are
four error terms. The model is "structural" in the sense that it has a
particular factor structure of the errors that arises from the
in:position of a particular utility function (albeit one with flexible
form) and a presumption that the major source of variation in
choices arises from heterogeneity in a selected set of preference
parameters. Since wage rates are unobserved for non-workers, KM
also specify a log wage equation as
in(w) = x’v + e,,, (7)
The five error terms in the model (Ea,eA,EF,SR, and ew) are
assumed to be distributed multivariate normal with an unrestricted
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2covariance matrix with diagonal elements fla, J = a,A,F,R, w, and
with off-diagonal elements pjkcr jcrk, j,k = a,A,F,R,w . The
elements of the covariance matrix are all identified by the
normalisations in the model and the other parameters of the model
are identified by the distributional assumptions and various non-
linearities. However, to lessen their dependence on those
functional form assumptions, KM also impose exclusion restrictions
in Equations (5)-(7) by employing variables that affect programme
participation but not labour supply and by excluding some
variables that are in (6) from (5). Also, as in more standard wage-
labou>supply models, KM exclude some variables in (5) from (7)
and some variables in (7) from (5) in order to identify the
parameters of each.
KM estimate the model using the Monte Carlo simulation
methods of estimation because the dimension of the error space is
large, and because deriving the boundaries of the error space
within which each choice is optimal is analytically difficult KM
apply a variety of simulation methods, including the simulated
method of moments developed by McFadden (1989).
A drawback of the KM model, as in many discrete-hours
models, is that it does not allow optimisation error or measurement
error in the choices. This has shown to be an important issue in
the literature not just because it is reasonable to suppose such
error exists, but because it is necessary to explain why
observations might be seen in cells which have predicted
probabilities of zero. KM added an i.i.d, extreme-value error to the
utilities in part to circumvent the problem, but a true
measurement-error interpretation is inconsistent with that
specification (a true measurement-error interpretation requires
adding errors to the observed choices, not to the latent utilities).
This is an area for further work.
Estimates. The model was estimated on 1984 data from a
representative, cross-section of the US population drawn from a
survey called the SIPP (Survey of Income and Programme
Participation). The sample was composed of all lone mothers aged
18-64 in the US that year, although a few families with high assets
were excluded. Otherwise, all such mothers were excluded,
whether on welfare or not. Part-time work was defined as 1-35
hours per week, and full-time was defined as over 35 hours. As
the data distribution turned out (Keane and Moffitt, 1998, p.565),
almost all mothers not on any welfare programme worked, and
almost all mothers on any type of welfare programme did not
work. Thus the choice for eligible women seemed almost bimodal
- women could go on welfare and not work, or stay off welfare
and work. The best explanation for this difference is the extremely
high tax rates in the programmes, which were often over 100 per
cent. Tax rates in the AFDC programme are approximately 100 per
cent by themselves; those in the Food Stamp programme are about
30 per cent; and in the housing programme, they range from 10
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per cent to 30 per cent. Thus the cumulative tax rate for those
participating in more than one programme generally exceeded 100
per cent.8
The KM estimates of the full model are shown in Table 1.1
The first portion of the table shows the coefficients on the
elements of the X vector for tastes for work, stigma costs, and the
wage equation (see Equations (5) - (7)). The specification of the
vector shown in the table represents the final specification after
considerable testing. The parameter estimates are mainly as
expected from other work. Children significantly reduce labour
supply; they also reduce welfare costs for AFDC and Food Stamps
(i.e., they increase welfare participation), though the effect is not
significant. Women who are older, who have higher levels of
education, who are in good health, and who are white have higher
levels of labour supply and usually have lower welfare
participation propensities, though once again not always
significantly. The state unemployment rate has a very weak
negative effect on labour supply, workers in SMSAs and in states
with high fractions of employment in services (where low-income
women are heavily concentrated) have higher wages, and
individuals in states with high AFDC administrative expenses have
lower AFDC participation rates but higher Food Stamp
participation rates, possibly because these expenses are spent
implementing more stringent administrative AFDC requirements.
The second panel of the table shows the estimates of the utility
function parameters and the covariance matrix of the errors. Initial
estimates of the quadratic utility function (4) revealed a lack of
significant interactions between H and Y, or between H or Y and
programme participation; the model shown in Table 1.2 therefore
omits these temps. The remaining parameters are all significant at
conventional levels. The utility function parameters flH~ and
fin’ have no direct interpretation but they together determine
wage and income elasticities. At the means the uncompensated
wage elasticity ~,v is 1.82 and the total income elasticity(~y) is
.21. The wage elasticity is in the high end of prior estimates for
women, but most prior estimates have been obtained for married
women rather than female heads. The income elasticity is on the
low side of past estimates for married women, on the other hand.
The parameter YR measures the effect of housing benefits, and
is small and has a high standard error, implying that subsidised
housing benefits have no significant impact on participation in
housing programmes. KM concluded that this estimate reflected
extensive rationing in the allocation of subsidised housing units.
8 However, as discussed by Keane and Moffitt, the cumulative tax rate is not the
simple sum of all three because the benefit formulas interact, i.e., some of the
programmes treat each others benefits as income and hence tax them. This tends
to lower the cumulative tax rate.
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Table 1.1: Keane-Moffitt Estimation Results (with housing)
No. children
less than 18
No children
tess than 5
South
Education
Age
Age Squared/100
Fair or poor
health
Race (1 =white)
State
unemployment
rate
SMSA
State Service
Employment Pct.
State AFDC
Admin.
expenses/100
Constant
Utility Function
Parameters
~,,w
b
7R
’YMED
"Y PH~
Correlation Matrix of
Errors
Sir
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,
* = significant at the 10 per cent level,
Sample size = 968.
Parameters in three cost equations (including sigmas) are divided by 10.
Multiplied by 100.
~’ Multiplied by 10000.
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In the US, the stock of housing units and housing vouchers is
limited and there is excess demand for slots and the criteria by
which slots are awarded have little relation to the potential benefit
from such housing. KM dropped housing from the model
thereafter.
1.5
The Keane-
Moffitt Model:
Simulations
Table 1.2 shows simulations of the model obtained by
computing mean probabilities for each of the outcome categories
over all individuals in the sample for different alterations in the
budget constraint. The first row shows the baseline simulation
while the second and third rows show the effects of reducing the
marginal tax rates facing welfare recipients. Interestingly, a
reduction of the AFDC tax rate from its current level of 100 per
cent to 50 per cent has scarcely any effect on labour supply, and it
actually increases the participation rate in both AFDC and Food
Stamps. This result is a reflection of a phenomenon noted in the
welfare literature sometimes referred to as the "breakeven
problem". The problem arises because a reduction in a welfare-
programme tax rate raises the breakeven level (i.e., the point at
which eligibility terminates), which draws some individuals onto
the rolls with consequent reductions in labour supply.
That this is occurring in the present example is clear from Table
1.2, for the fraction of recipients working full-time actually fails
when the tax rate is reduced; this arises because it is generally full-
time workers who are made newly eligible, or nearly eligible, by
the increase in the breakeven point, and it is they who reduce
their labour supply when going onto the welfare rolls. The table
also shows the effect on costs, defined as the increase in benefits
of new entrants minus benefit reductions from existing recipients
who work more or who leave the rolls, plus the change in the tax
payments of both groups, as a percentage of initial benefit
payments minus tax payments. KM find that there is little effect on
costs from the tax rate reduction to 50 per cent, for the benefit
savings from increased numbers of working recipients is cancelled
out by increased benefits for new entrants.
A more massive change of reducing both AFDC and Food
Stamp tax rates to .10 succeeds in increasing labour supply by
about 2 hours per week, but at the cost of increasing the AFDC
caseload by about one-third and the Food Stamp caseload by
about one-fourth. The tax-rate reduction in this case induces large
numbers of non-working recipients to go to work, either part-time
or full-time, outweighing the labour supply reductions of the new
recipients. However, costs rise by almost 80 per cent for this
reform because of the larger number of recipients.
The effects of these changes in marginal tax rates are in sharp
contrast to the effects of increasing wage rates, for the two are not
syn~netrical for welfare programmes. The remaining rows of Table
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Table 1.2: Simulated Responses to Changes in the Budget Constraint
Work Hours Distribution (%) Mean Cost
Hours Change
NW PT FT Worked (%)
Baseline                 25.0 33.5 34:6 10.4 55.0 24.1
Decrease 25.7 33.7 .... 33.7 11.5 54.8 24:3 1
in AFDC tax rate from
1.00 to .50a
Decrease in 32.8 40.0 2719 14.4 57.7
AFDC and
Food Stamp tax
rates to 10
26.0 79
Wage Increase of $1 20.9 28:9
SubsidisedMinimum 191i 26.8
Wage of $5
b
’ 2’Wage-Rate Subs dy ~ 0:3 2&3
Increase in EITCc 21:9 319
Universal 20.8 2~8~)
Work Subsidyd
Notes..
Pa = probability of participating in AFDC.
PF = probability of participating in Food Stamps.
NW = probability of not working.
PT = probability of working part-time.
FT = probability of working full-time.
Mean Hours Worked = 20*PT + 40*FT.
All income screens simultaneously eliminated.
b Subsidy = .50* ($6.00 - wage).
26:5       9:7
22.4 10.8
10;6
20:0
17.8
63.8 27.5 162
66~8 28.9 128
64:6 28.0 89
52:8 25.1 46
54:5 25.4 -3
c A refundable tax credit equal to 30 pet" cent of earnings up to a maximmn $1500 annual credit, followed by a
20 pet" cent phase-out rate.
a All AFDC and FSP deductions for work expenses are eliminated and replaced by a work subsidy defined by:
Subsidy = $23 - .07*Income, and the subsidy is also offered to those off welfare.
1.2 demonstrate this result. An increase in the gross hourly wage
rate of $1 significantly reduces participation in both AFDC and
Food Stamps and also increases expected weekly hours of work
by about 3.5 hours. A wage change pivots the budget constraint
around the origin and increases income if off welfare both above
and below breakeven (the below-breakeven income increase pulls
women off AFDC as well as the above-breakeven increase), in
contrast to the tax-rate reduction. The magnitude of the hours
increase is somewhat less than that implied by the wage elasticity
(which was 1.94) primarily because about one-third of the sample
does not work. The wage-increase increases costs by more than
160 per cent (costs in this case are defined to include the
increased wage costs).
A subsidised minimum wage (i.e., a government subsidy of
wage rates up to $5, not a requirement that the firm pay that
wage), which pulls up only the bottom portion of the wage
distribution, has even greater downward effects on programme
participation and upward effects on labour supply. However, it
costs less than the dolla>increase in the wage because the wages
of high-skilled workers are not increased. A wage-rate subsidy - a
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policy often proposed to draw women off welfare - with a 50 per
cent subsidy rate up to a wage of $6 per hour is simulated to have
about the same effects as the wage-increase, but once again at
lower cost because the wage increases are concentrated at the
lower end of the distribution. An increase in the EITC (the earned
income tax credi0 operates in a similar way, by increasing after-tax
wages if off AFDC. The effects on programme participation and
labour supply are in the same direction as those already discussed,
but smaller in magnitude. The smaller magnitude is, in part, a
result of the phase-out region of an EITC, which tends to reduce
labour supply.
The final row of the table shows the effect of offering a small
work subsidy to women off the welfare rolls as well as to women
on the rolls (for the latter, to replace existing welfare deductions
for work-related expenses). This policy both increases labour
supply and reduces programme participation, at reduced cost. The
policy succeeds in drawing women off the rolls because the small
work subsidy substantially reduces the work-discouraging effects
of fixed costs of work (which we have in our model), and because
many women with high levels of stigma are willing to leave the
welfare rolls, even at reduced income, if such work subsidies are
available. Costs are reduced because of the substantial numbers of
women who exit the rolls.
1.6
Frontiers:
Dynamic
Simulations
The discussion thus far has no doubt demonstrated that there are
many issues to work on in tile static model, and which could bear
improvement. The specification of tile demand side of the labour
market and incorporating childcare considerations are just two
examples. But a more fundamental problem with the model that is
often mentioned is its static nature, and lack of dynamics.
There are many types of dynamics that are missed in the KM
and other static models. The first is the existence of adjustment
costs. Because there are adjustment costs to going on and off the
welfare rolls, any policy change will take time to have an effect.
Adjustment costs are certain to be present because the costs of
learning about a programme and applying for it, in the case of
entry, or from learning to become "self-sufficient" off the roils, in
the case of exit, requires time. These costs are quite likely to be
large, but they are not illuminated by static models.
Thinking of welfare participation as a process of entry and exit
over time, rather than as a one-shot static decision, also helps
understand the key issue of the effect of changes in earnings
deductions on welfare programmes discussed earlier. The work
disincentives that arise from lowering the welfare-programme tax
rate have their effects, in practice, in the form of changed entry
and exit effects onto, and off, welfare. A lower tax rate on the
welfare programme makes the programme more attractive because
income is higher on the programme. This implies that any given
comparison between an off-welfare activity like a job offer, and
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the welfare programme, will tilt slightly more toward the latter
than it did before. Thus entry rates will increase. The lower tax
rate also reduces the exit rate because recipients are less likely to
move off welfare if they will lose their now-greater welfare benefit
while working. Any given comparison between a particular job
offer from the private sector, to the welfare programme, will again
be tilted slightly toward the latter.
Whether such entry and exit effects would occur would depend
on several issues. One is the degree of forward lookingness of the
welfare population - that is, the discount rate. A key question is
whether welfare recipients and welfare eligibles are completely
myopic, or whether they are at least partly forward looking. If they
are completely myopic and therefore compare only the current
gains and losses of being on welfare, and do not anticipate the
gains from the lower tax rate, the lower tax rate may have little
effect on entry. If welfare recipients and potential applicants are
not completely myopic, on the other hand, but are at least partly
folward looking, responses could be quite different.
Another type of dynamics ignored by the static model is the
development, or stagnation, of work skills, commonly termed
human capital. Nothing in a static model permits future wages to
depend on past work effort. Yet it seems clear that in the real
world they do, and "that this has implications for welfare reform.
Being on welfare, for example, leads to lower wages in the future,
as skills deteriorate through non-work, leading to even higher
probabilities of being on welfare in the future. Being off welfare
and working leads to human capital accumulation and higher
wages, leading to even lower probabilities of being on welfare in
the future. This may lead to divergent paths in which some
individuals end up with long "stays" on welfare and others end up
with almost none. It may also explain the common data feature
noted previously, which is that almost all women on welfare do
not work and almost all women off welfare do work.
Another source of dynamics that is missed by the static model
is job search and unemployment spell dynamics. The static model
assumes that jobs are always available at the going wage, and that
an individual has a one-shot offer to accept or reject jobs at that
wage. But in fact those who are unemployed only get a certain
number of offers and, if they reject them, they know that they will
get more offers in the future. There is a large literature on models
of job search (Devine and Kiefer, 1991) which illustrates behaviour
under this type of model. There is no reason in principle that it
could not be simulated.
Most of these types of dynamics have not been modelled, but
some aspects of the first one - the dynamics of entry and exit, and
turnover in welfare programmes - has. The most straightforward
way to incorporate these fixed costs of transitions into the model is
to specify a dynamic discrete choice model under uncertainty (see
Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989 for a survey and Swann, 1995, for an
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application to welfare participation). At time t assume that the
individual maximises
v (f/,, y,, Pro, )
T
=Et p , Tv,Plr,...,/~,nr)- F , Yr, Plv ,...,/~,nr ] Sv_l
T=I
= U~t,Yt,Plt ..... Pmt )- F(Ht,Yt,PIt .....PmtlSt-1)]
T
+ E, E p [U(Hv,Yr,Plr .....Pmr)- F(Hz,Yr,Plr .....PmzlSr-1)] (8)
"r=t+l
where p is the time rate of discount, T is the length of the horizon,
U is the same function as shown in Equation (1), F is a fixed cost
function, and 5,_1 is a vector of the H and P variables for time
periods t-l, t-2, and further periods back. The simplest
specification is one in which only last period’s state (t-l) matters
for the transition costs, but a more realistic specification would
allow the duration in different states to affect fixed costs. A
complete specification of the fixed cost function would allow those
costs to be unique for each transition. In the case of the Markov
model in which only time t-1 matters, one would have
where i and j are indicators of the state at periods t and t=l,
respectively, and where Z is a vector of individual co-variates and
policy parameters that affect fixed costs.
If Equations (4) - (7) are also assumed, this model embeds the
KM model. At each t, after the transitions have been made, choice
can still be described by the same static structure of the KM model,
but with the new fixed costs subtracted off. When the fixed cost
functions are added in, they can be combined with the cost
parameters shown in Equation (4), with the only alteration in the
interpretation to be that costs depend on the individual’s work and
programme participation history, not just the current values of
labour supply and prograrmaae participation. Thus a period-by-
period estimation and simulation could still be performed. But this
model also generates a series of transition-rate equations,
composed of entry and exit equations, as well, so the individual
moves over time to an equilibrium. Policy changes induce
additional movements to a new equilibrium.
Estinaation of models of this type require considerable
computational burden but that burden has been greatly reduced by
modern computational technologies. Policy simulation still requires
more computational burden as usual as well because the optimal
plan for each individual has to be worked out. However, this is
much simpler than estimation itself. Policy simulation can also be
conducted by randomly drawing un-observables from a known or
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estimated distribution, and this provides another avenue toward
reduction of effort.
An alternative strategy which reduces burden further is to
specify the future value functions in an ad hoc way rather than in
a structural way. In the model in (8) above, the future expectations
(i.e., the value functions) are a function of the whole dynamic
model. One could, alternatively, specify reduced-forms for these
functions and thereby simplify the model.
The major estimation and simulation issue in this model is the
requirement that the distributions of the un-observables be
properly accounted for. Each period’s distribution of families over
the different work-participation cells is conditional on last period’s
distribution and hence is a truncated distribution. If the un-
observables are correlated over time, as they no doubt are, then
the distinction between heterogeneity and state dependence must
be implicitly or explicitly made. This is more of a problem for
estimation than for simulation, for when simulating one can simply
start off a population at a particular point in time with an
untmncated distribution of un-observables, and then, by means of
Monte Carlo simulation, simulate the time path of choices and let
the distribution of un-observables take the path implied by the
model. A complication that would arise even in simulation,
however, is the need to calibrate the model parameters to an on-
going set of observed work and participation choices.
An approach generally similar to this has been taken in a recent
US dynamic simulation model called the STEWARD model
(Beebout et al., 1994). The STEWARD model was developed to
simulate the initial welfare proposals put forth in the US by
President Clinton in his first term, whose major features were
increased work requirements, time limits followed by guaranteed
public service jobs, increased health insurance coverage, and an
increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit (an earnings subsidy for
private-sector work). These provisions required dynamic
simulation.
The STEWARD model uses the KM model in Equations (4) - (7)
above, but with lagged duration dependence on welfare added to
the vector of variables affecting stigma. Thus a time dependence is
set up. The expected value functions in the dynamic programme
are ignored completely, consistent with a completely myopic
individual choice. This is therefore a drawback. The STEWARD
model calibrates choices to a panel of NLSY and PSID single
mothers by drawing from distributions of individual-specific
random effects, and i.i.d, shocks on top of those random effects, to
be consistent with observed histories.
Table 1.3 shows some sample output from the STEWARD
simulation of President Clinton’s welfare reform plan on AFDC
caseloads and distributions. The initial reduction in the AFDC case-
load - coming from the increased earnings subsidy off the rolls,
primarily - is rather small. However, the effect cumulates over
time because the fixed costs both slow down movement of
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welfare, and also tend to keep individuals off welfare once they
have gone off. Individuals and families are moving toward a new
equilibrium and hence are less likely to come back onto the rolls
(although some do because of random shocks).9
1.7
Summary and
Conclusions
Table 1.3: Effects of President Clinton’s Welfare Reform Package
on Welfare Caseload and Dependency
Per cent Reduction
AFDC Caseload, by 6-month period
First period
-2.5
Second pedod
-7.8
Third period
-7.1
Fourth period
-8.8
Fifth period
-12.3
Sixth period
-17.8
Seventh period
-21:5
Eighth period (four years out)
-23.7
Per cent Distribution of Cumulative
Time on AFDC over the 4 years
Never On
0-12 months
13-24 months
25-36 months
37-48 months
Source: Beebout et al. (1995, p.52)
The model is also capable
0.2
10.8
21.3
-2.3
-28.6
of simulating changes in the
distribution on the rolls of short-termers versus long-termers. The
percentage of the eligible population never on welfare does not
change very nmch over the first four years of the reform (though it
would change more later) but there is a large reduction of those
who are on more than half of the period (25 or more months) as
compared to the number on less than two years.
Microsimulation of the labour supply effects of tax and transfer
programmes has made great progress over the past twenty years.
Theoretical models as well as computational methods have been
developed which can address the labour supply effects of virtually
any standard programme. Moreover, the empirical results to date,
at least in US simulations, demonstrate that behavioural responses
to welfare programmes do matter, and that they significantly affect
costs and caseloads. Thus constructing good microsimulation
models would appear to have considerable payoffs.
At the same time, more progress needs to be made and the
models that have been developed need to be made more realistic
and therefore more accurate. Perhaps the most fundamental
weakness of the models at the present time is their static nature,
’~ The time limit in this plan is four years, so none of the exits are a result of that.
In addition, because of the myopia assumption, there are no anticipatory
departures from the rolls.
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and their relative failure to address the lags over which policy
effects occur and hence to give policy makers some information
on the time frame of effects. Nevertheless, estimates from existing
models still provide good first-round estimates of the medium-term
responses to alterations in programme features.
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2. BEHAVIOURAL
 IICROSIMULATION
MEFHODS FOR POUCY
ANALYSIS*
John Creedy, Alan Duncan
2.1
Introduction
Microsimulation modelling has now become widely used for
policy analysis, both as a means to assess the distributional
consequences of a tax or benefit change among heterogeneous
groups of families in the population, and as a means with which to
assess the likely cost to the Government of a proposed or
hypothetical policy reform. The most common type of model is
"static", in the sense that behaviour is assumed to be exogenous to
the tax and benefit system. Based on a large scale cross-sectional
data,1 such models enable the researcher to examine "impact" or
"morning after" effects of specified changes in taxes and benefits,
and can identify gainers and losers from a particular reform. The
advantage of using such a data set, compared with the more
anecdotal use of so-called "typical" households, is that it is
possible to capture the kind of heterogeneity at the individual and
household level that is found in practice. This leads to a more
authentic assessment of the overall effects of tax or benefit reform,
and "grossing up" factors can usually be used in order to obtain
appropriate aggregate tax and benefit expenditure levels.
However, many tax and transfer policies are designed specifically
to have labour supply effects, particularly those, which tW to
* We are grateful to Tim Callan, Vincent Hogan, Julian McCrae, Robert Moffitt and
seminar participants at ESRI, Dublin and NATSEM, Canberra for useful comments
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 These include, for example, the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) or Income
Distribution Survey (IDS) in Australia, the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) or
Family Resources Survey (FRS) in the United Kingdom.
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encourage more labour force participation/ Tax revenue and
expenditure calculations may be seriously misleading if potential
labour supply responses are not taken into consideration.
Furthermore, without behavioural responses it is not possible to
examine the welfare effects of changes; attention is necessarily
restricted to measures of changes in net income of individuals or
households. Very small changes in labour supply may nevertheless
be associated with large welfare losses.
The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to
microsimulation modelling where labour supply responses to
changes in direct taxes and benefits are explicitly modelled. This
type of modelling presents many computational as well as
analytical problems. The need to handle extremely complex
budget constraints, allowing for the fact that each individual’s
constraint is unique, along with a desire to model considerable
preference heterogeneity, imposes strong modelling and computer
programming demands. All components of tax and benefit models
must be closely integrated and, given the large number of
individuals involved; a premium is placed on the production of
efficient computer routines. However, this paper concentrates on
the analytical rather than the programming and econometric
aspects of modelling. Furthermore, it is not intended to present a
guide for constructing microsimulation models: attention is
restricted to the labour supply aspects.
Section 2.2 begins with a brief introduction to the basic theory
of labour supply, and the problem of integration from a labour
supply function to the utility function. Section 2.3 turns to a
discussion of the various elements, which combine to form a
practical computational tool for behavioural microsimulation.
These elements briefly comprise: an appropriately modified static
microsimulation model; an algorithm by which complete and
accurate budget constraints may be generated for each member of
the simulation sample; and a flexible model of labour supply
which allocates individuals to points on any relevant budget
constraint/
Section 2.4 discusses alternative methods by which such models
may be estimated. The major debate in this regard is the choice of
a continuous or discrete mode of estimation. The merits of both
are discussed and the appropriateness of continuous and discrete
models for behavioural microsimulation are examined.
Section 2.5 turns to the method of finding the optimal labour
supply for each individual. The economic principle involved, that
of jointly choosing the number of hours of work and consumption
in order to reach the highest indifference curve subject to a budget
a See inter alia the Europe-wide debate on an appropriate structure for in-work
benefits; the series of reforms in the UK to the Family Credit (FC) system and the
introduction of a successor, the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC); the close
scrutiny in the US of the efficacy of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
3 This allocation can either be probabilistic or definitive.
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2.2
Some Basic
Theory
constraint, is elementaW. However, the efficient evaluation of such
choices, given the labour supply function and indirect utility
function, is not so straightforward. Moreover, the estimation
methods employed (principally, whether the method is continuous
or discrete) can determine to a degree the mechanism by which
optimal labour supply is evaluated. Section 2.6 considers the
evaluation of the welfare effects of tax and benefit changes.
Section 2.7 briefly concludes.
The simplest approach to the analysis of labour supply involves
tnaximisation of a specified direct utility function, U (h, c), where b
and c represent hours worked and consumption (or net income,
where the price index of c is normalised to unity) respectively,
subject to a budget constraint. Unlike the standard commodity
demand model in which prices are constant irrespective of the
amount of each good consumed, the individual faces a variety of
net wage rates. The actual wage depends on the chosen position
on the budget constraint, and is therefore, like the number of
hours worked, endogenous. However, an interior solution (a
tangency position) can be regarded as if it were generated by a
simple linear constraint of the form
wh + I-Z = c, (1)
where w and/.z represent the appropriate net wage rate and virtual
income respectively. Care must be taken in the choice of direct
utility to be used when deriving labour supply functions, and often
the more tractable direct utility functions lead to labour supply
functions which are in most cases insufficiently flexible for
practical labour supply modelling.4 The difficulty of solving the
first-order conditions for utility maximisation, starting from a direct
utility function, are familiar from the standard commodity demand
models. Further progress often involves making use of duality
results, starting with either the indirect utility function or the labour
demand function itself. This section discusses the latter approach.
2.2.1 THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION
Consider a flexible supply function where, for example, h is
considered to vaW continuously with w and #. In other words,
h=h (w, lA) (2)
See Stern (1986, pp.181-184) for a discussion of the properties of a wide range of
candidate labour supply functions, either specified directly (for example, the semi-
log supply function) or derived from direct utility (the linear expenditure system,
the CES, quadratic direct utility and direct translog) and indirect utility functions
(the indirect quadratic, or indirect translog).
26 "I’AXFkS, TIL,~NSFERS AND Ia’,,BOUR/vlARKET RESPONSES: WHAT CAN MICROSIMULATION TELL US?
It is required that this type of function is consistent with utility
maximisation, certainly for the purposes of behavioural
microsimulation where individuals may be simulated to change the
number of hours they work quite considerably in response to
some policy reform.~ A first requirement for consistency is
therefore that (2) satisfies the integrability conditions¯ Application
of the general conditions derived by Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) to
the context of labour supply gives the result that the wage
response of the compensated labour supply is non-negative; that
¯ 6
IS,
ah h ah >_ 0 (3)
aw a/~
This condition is referred to as the Slutsky condition and can easily
be checked from the form of (2) specified¯
In order to examine the welfare effects of tax changes it is
necessary to be able to derive the indirect utility function, V (w, I.Z)
from the form of (2) used. It is not sufficient just to know that the
integrability conditions are satisfied. The need to be able to obtain
an explicit form for the indirect utility function places a strong
constraint on the range of functional forms for (2) that can be
used. Numerical methods of integration are available, but would
be too cumbersome in microsimulation models given the very
large number of times this would be required¯
The indirect utility function can be derived as follows] Consider
first the standard consumer problem involving the choice of
consumption of each of n goods, xi,i = 1 ..... n subject to a budget
constraint, ~i pixi = m. For a single price change, say of good i
combinations of m and Pi for which utility is constant must satisfy
a V dpi + aV dm= 0,
(4)
api     am
which can be re-arranged to give
(5)
5 In estimation one ought to test rather than impose concavity. Indeed, this was
one of the problems with the methods Hausman (1985) originally employed to
account for non-linear taxes in estimation. His probabilistic method of factoring
taxes into the likelihood used for estimation essentially required the satisfaction of
the Slutsky condition at each kink point on the budget constraint. In conjunction
with a linear labour supply model, this forced positive wage elasticities and the
global satisfaction of Slutsky concavity.
6 These require (for necessity and sufficiency) the Slutsky matrix to be symmetric
and negative semi-definite. For further discussion in the present context, see
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp.89-93) and Stern (1986, pp.145-146).
7 Early use of the approach was made by Mohring (1971), followed by Hause
(1975). It was explored further by Deaton and Muellbaure (1980) and Hausman
(1981); for further references and discussion, see Creedy (1997).
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2.3
Behavioural
Micro-
simulation: Some
Prerequisites
From Roy’s Identity, the Marshallian demand, x(p, m), is related to
the indirect utility function by
xi(p,m)= aV/aPi (6)
aV IOm
Combining (5) and (6), ~ m/~ Pi = xi (P, m), so that the solution to
the first-order differential equation, -2 m/~ pf =xi (p,m)= O, along
with an appropriate initial condition (for the constant of
integration), gives the required minimum expenditure associated
with any given utility level and set of prices. It therefore gives the
expenditure function. In the labour supply context, a choice can
be made concerning the way in which the expenditure function is
expressed. One approach involves writing it in terms of the
individual’s "full income" defined as M = p + wT, where T is the
total number of hours available (the individual’s endowment of
time). Alternatively, it can be written simply in terms of virtual
income, #. The two approaches give equivalent results, but of
course the use of just p avoids the need to specify T. It is most
convenient here to avoid the use of full income.8 Hence,
recognising also that work is a "bad", it is required to solve the
differential equation
O~ ~h(w,**)= 0 (7)
~w
for p. The constant of integration may be equated to the initial
utility level, U so that the solution gives the expenditure function
as p (w, O). This is then (where possible) inverted to obtain the
required indirect utility function, V (w, p). Given the indirect utility
function, it is in principle possible to obtain the direct utility
function, U (c,b). This is achieved by using the labour supply
function to solve for w in terms of b and p, combining this with
the budget constraint, # = c-wh, and substituting in V (w, I~) to get
U (c ,b). However, it is not always possible to solve for w
explicitly from the specified labour supply function, so this process
may need to be carried out numerically.
There are essentially three components, which combine to form
a practical and serviceable behavioural microsimulation model.
The first is a detailed so-called "static" microsimulation model
(sometimes termed a tax-benefit model) with which to impute net
household incomes at a micro level for a representative sample of
households, and for both incumbent and counterfactual tax-benefit
8 See also Stern (1986, p. 148). However, the use of virtual income can create
problems if ,u is zero or negative.
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regimes. Such models have existed for some time/ The second
component is a quantifiable behavioural model of individual tastes
for net income and labour supply (or equivalently, non-work
time), with which preferred labour supply for a given set of
economic circumstances may be simulated. For the purposes of
behavioural microsimulation this essentially relates to the budget
constraint faced by the individual under a given tax and benefit
regime. The third component is a mechanism to allocate to each
individual a preferred supply of hours in the face of any tax-
benefit system. Analysing simulated changes in this allocation
between some base tax system and a counterfactual regime forms
the essence of behavioural microsimulation.
2.3.1 THE STATIC MICROSIMULATION MODEL
A primary requirement of any behavioural model (other than the
obvious need for an appropriate data base) is a component that is
able to apply a specified tax and transfer system, involving as
many as possible of the complexities of means-tested social
welfare programmes, to each individual.1° Such a component in
fact forms a "static" or non-behavioural model. In the present
paper, the existence of such a component, capable of evaluating a
given individual’s net income for a specified number of hours
worked, is simply taken for granted. That said, it is important to
establish the minimal specification requirements required of a
static microsinmlation model that is to form part of a behavioural
microsinmlation facility. These should ideally include the following
three features. The static model must have the ability to simulate
household net incomes at hours’ points other than those observed
for each individual in the simulation sample. For this to be
possible, information about the individual’s hourly wage rate must
be provided, along with other characteristics. The wage rate is
typically evaluated by dividing total earned income by the
reported number of hours worked. For non-working individuals,
an appropriate wage rate must be imputed, usually based on an
estimated wage function. Such a function would normally be
estimated using the same data set that forms the basis of the
simulation model (allowing for many individual characteristics),
with allowance for the sample selection involved in observing only
the wage rates of individuals who work in the sample period.
For the application of continuous as opposed to discrete
behavioural microsimulation methods, the static tax benefit model
Examples include sWITCH from The Economic and Social Research Institute,
Dublin, TAKBEN from the IFS, POLIMOD from the Microsimulation Unit in
Cambridge, and STINMOD from NATSEM in Australia.
~0 The extent to which the complete tax and transfer system can be modelled
depends on the details provided in the data base; in view of the complexity of tax
systems, it is unlikely that any model would be able to deal with every single
feature. In some cases it may be possible to impute values of missing variables,
such as assets.
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ought ideally to have the facility to generate complete and
accurate budget constraints for all individuals, and not simply a
collection of household net incomes at a discrete collection of
hour’s points. Increasingly, econometric techniques require
resampling methods to build up distributions for important but
potentially stochastic or endogenous economic variables. An
example might be the control of wage endogeneity in discrete
choice models of labour supply, following Keane and Moffitt
(1998) or van Soest (1995).
2.3.2 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
The determination of preferred labour supply in continuous
behavioural microsimulation requires complete knowledge about
the budget constraint facing each individual over the whole of the
relevant range of hours.11 As mentioned above, one component of
a behavioural model is a routine which uses the detailed
information about the tax and transfer system and calculates the
net income, for any type of individual with a specified wage rate
and working a particular number of hours.
One approach to calculating budget constraints, which is often
used when they are produced for illustrative purposes, involves
using a static model to evaluate net income for a large number of
labour supply (time) intervals. In order to identify the corners and
discontinuities reasonably accurately, small time intervals are
needed; for five-minute intervals spread over 50 hours of work,
600 evaluations of net income would be required. However, in the
context of behavioural models involving a large number of
different individuals, this would be computationally very
cumbersome and inefficient. In particular, it requires the same
number of evaluations of net income irrespective of the complexity
of an individual’s budget constraint, and may not precisely identify
the position of each kink. Budget constraints can be obtained more
efficiently and accurately using the procedure devised by Duncan
and Stark (1995) in which trigonometric rules are used to identify
kinks and discontinuities. Their algorithm is initiated at a user-
defined start and end point to the budget constraint (expressed
either in terms of hours or gross income). The budget constraint is
then extrapolated forward and back from the start and end points
respectively. If the intersection of these extrapolated segments
coincides with a point on the tree budget constraint, the algorithm
H This contrasts with discrete microsimulation where net incomes before and after
a policy reform are required only for a finite set of hours’ points. Whilst
computationally much simpler, discrete microsimulation suffers from a number of
drawbacks. First, simulated hours do not cover the full range of feasible hours’
choices open to the individual. Second, the precise detail of the budget constraint
is lost in simulation. Third, it is computationally non-trivial to calibrate the
econometric model to replicate observed behaviour. See Duncan and Weeks
(1998) for a discussion of this last point.
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terminates. Otherwise, the budget constraint is subdivided at the
intersection and the algorithm proceeds separately on each
subsegment.
A full technical description of the budget constraint algorithm,
together with source code, is provided in Duncan and Stark
(1995). Here we concentrate on a practical implementation by
presenting budget constraints, marginal effective tax rate (METR)
schedules and METR diagnostics, all of which derive directly from
the Duncan-Stark algorithm. This implementation is based on input
from the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS),
a new microsimulation model of the Australian tax and transfer
system under development at the Melbourne Institute of Applied
Economic and Social Research.I2
For our particular example we focus on the budget constraint
facing the primary earner in a two-person household under the
March 1998 Australian tax and transfer system. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
present graphical representations of the budget constraint and
METR schedules facing the primary earner in an example two-
person household. The complexity of the tax schedule, and the
success and accuracy with which the algorithm pinpoints kinks
and discontinuities, is evident particularly from the second METR
schedule. Once kinks have been accurately identified, one can
proceed to diagnose the reason (or reasons) for the presence of
the turning point by perturbing hours around the kink and
examining the changes in the constituent parts of full net income.
In Table 2.1 the turning points are rationalised for the March 1998
Australian tax and transfer system.
Figure 2.1
1ooo
9oo
5OO
400
0 10 20 30 40 50
hours per week (head)
~2 For full details of the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator, see Creedy
and Duncan (1999).
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Figure 2.2
10 20 30 40 50
hours per week (head)
Table 2.1: METR Diagnostics: Primary Earner
Hours Gross TU Net METR
0.00 0~00 598.60 0~000
0.72 14.42 613.03 0.200
1.50 30.00 625.49 \ 0.700
3.50 70.00 637:49 0.900
4.40 87.94 639.28
4,40 87.96 629.67 0.900
5.01 100,29 630.90 0,760
12.54 250.81 667.02 0.900
14.30 286.02 670.53 1.400
14.86 297.29 666.03 0.700
19.90 398.08 696.27 0.880
20,55 411.04 697.82 1:080
2.22 444.37 695,15 0.895
23.51 470.19 697.87 0;855
30.33 606.60 717,65 0.355
36.54 730.77 797.73’ ....0.445
48.08 961.54 925:81 0,485
50.00 1000:00 ....945:62
Probable Reason for Kink
Constraint Starts
Income Tax Starts
MR Changes for New Start Payment
MR Changes for Beneficiary_Tax Rebate
MR Changes for New StartPayment
MRChanges for Beneficiary Tax Rebate
Discontinuity
Family Tax Payment PtB Stops
Beneficiary Tax Rebate Stops
Partner’s MR Changes for Income Tax
Partner’s MR Changes for Family Payment
Parenting Payment Stops for Partner
MR Changes for Low Income Rebate
Medicare Levy Starts
MR Changes for Medicare Levy
L0w,lncome Rebate Stops
Partner’s MR Changes for Family Payment
Family Tax PaymentPt A Stops for Partner
Family Tax Assistance Starts
MR Changes for Income Tax
MR Changes fo[ Income Tax
Constraint Ends
Notes: Budget constraints and METR diagnostics generated using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer
Simulator (MITTS), and are based on the March 1998 Australian tax and transfer system. Budget sets and
marginal effective tax rates details relate to the principle earner in a two-earner couple with three young
children and one school aged child. The secondaW earner works for ten hours per week, and both adults in
the couple receive a gross hourly wage of Aus$20. See Creedy and Duncan (1999) for further details.
32 TAXES, TRANSFERS AND LABOUR MARKET RE.SPONSES: WHAT CAN MICROSIMULATION TELL US.7
In applying the algorithm in the context of behavioural
microsimulation, the position (number of hours) of all kinks and
slopes of all linear sections of the budget constraint of each
individual in a large and representative sample are automatically
computed. In addition, it is necessary to compute, for each linear
segment, the intersection of that linear section when extended to
the horizontal axis (that is, net income corresponding to zero
hours). For each linear section, the slope is identified as the net
wage rate and the intercept is referred to as the "virtual income"
corresponding to that section. The set of net wages, virtual
incomes and hours at which the net wage changes (that is, the
kink points) for the full microsimulation sample are retained for
use in the solution algoritlnn, described below in Section 2.5, for
determining optimal labour supply.
2.3.3 MODELS FOR LABOUR SUPPLY AND INDIRECT UTILITY
In specifying a form of labour supply function to be used in
behavioural microsinmlation, care must be taken to choose a
model which is sufficiently flexible to account for a wide range of
behavioural responses in estimation, yet consistent in simulation
with utiliW maximising behaviour for a high proportion of the
sample over a wide range of hours’ choices.
If the empirical model used in simulation is not broadly
consistent with the normal axioms of utiliW theory, then it is
unclear how one rationalises simulated behavioural responses to
some policy reform. Two alternatives are available. One option is
to specify directly the form of the labour supply function. This
option tends to be favoured in continuous studies, which place
emphasis on the flexibiliW of the relationship between hours and
wage rates. However, in order to compute an individual’s utiliW at
any point on the budget constraint, it is necessary to derive the
foma of the indirect utiliW function from whichever hours’ function
is preferred.
The second is to specify the model directly in terms of the
direct utiliW function. This is typically the most appropriate option
when estimating discrete models of labour market status, although
it is again necessary to derive the desired hours function if the
estimated model is to be applied to continuous behavioural
microsimulation. The link between the labour supply function,
specified in terms of continuous variations in hours worked, and
the indirect utiliW function has been outlined in Section 2.3, but
this subsection reports two examples in more detail.
Example 1: Specifying Labour Supply Directly
While several labour supply functions can be integrated to obtain
an explicit indirect utility function, it is important to use a flexible
fonn that allows them to be "backward bending" over a range of
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higher wage rates, while having a positive slope at lower wages.1~
This is particularly important when modelling female labour
supply. This need for flexibility rules out the use of a simple linear
function. The following discussion takes as an example the
specification introduced by Duncan (1993), wherebyTM
and the parameters a, /3 and )’ are allowed to depend on the
characteristics of the individual. From (8), 0 b/O/.t = ),/w, so for
this to be negative (for an increase in virtual income to increase
the consumption of leisure), it is required to have )’ < O.
Differentiation with respect to zo gives
aw
/3 - y (9)
Hence for ~t > 0 and /3 > O, the supply function is forward-
sloping for w = <\y’,/2//3. Substitution of (8) into the budget
constraint c = wb + I-t and differentiation gives
Oc
-- = a +/3(1 + log w), (10)
Ow
so that if ~z and /3 are positive, a higher wage is associated with
higher net income.
The derivation of the indirect utility function involves solving
the differential equation obtained by substituting (8) into (7), that
is
The solution gives the expenditure function, expressed in terms of
virtual income, as15
l.t(w,U)= Uw-)’- l-~[fllogw+cz_l~y]. (12)
This can easily be inverted to give the indirect utility function
lq-~/WI+, []’Z (1 "}-
1~       -- 1~---~ ]/3
ry +/31ogw+
. (13)
,3 For detailed treatment of some special cases, see Stern (1986).
,4 The use of a term in log w~ was investigated in Duncan (1993), but in most
cases it is not signififcant and is therefore omitted here.
,7 For the complementary function, ast + y St = 0 oJ a St _ y O w
a w w St w
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2.4
Estimating
Models of
Labour Supply
Hence, h as expressed in (8), arises from the maximisation of
(13) subject to the linear budget constraint (1). However, it can be
seen that no analytical expression can be found for the direct
utility function in this case.
Example 2: Specifying Preferences Directly
The alternative approach is to specify directly the form for
preferences, which underpin the economic model of labour
supply. For example, Keane and Moffitt (1998) favour a quadratic
direct utility function of the form
U ( h , c ) = t3fc2 + ~h2 + yc h + r3e + eh , (14)
where parameters a and e are allowed to depend on the
characteristics of the individual. This specification corresponds to a
labour supply function of the form
(15)
which can admit backward-bending labour supply at higher hours
for certain combinations of parameters. Substituting (15) and
c = wh + t.z in (14) yields fl:e indirect utility function.’6
The basic theory of labour supply behaviour is reasonably well
established. That is not to say that the preceding discussion is by
any means exhaustive; it does not examine life-cycle issues in
labour supply analysis, nor the complexities of the household
decision-making process and how that affects labour supply within
the family. Nevertheless the previous section provides a
framework within which the simulation of behavioural responses
might be investigated.
However, this does not solve the practical problem of
estimating empirical models of labour supply. Despite a well-
established theory, there exist many practical difficulties in
estimation. These include:
1. The incorporation of taxes;
2. Dealing with endogeneity and random preference heterogeneity;
3. Eliminating the reservation wage condition in a manner consis-
tent both with estimation and behavioural microsimulation;
4. Accommodating stochastic elements in microsimulation;
5. Dealing with incomplete welfare programme participation.
There are essentially two routes available when seeking to
resolve at least some of these difficulties. These are either a
,6 It is not clear why Stern (1986) considers the resulting expression to be
"inelegant".
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continuous mode of estimation, or a more discrete estimation
procedure. There are advantages and disadvantages with both,
although it is perhaps true to say that in recent years there has
been a move towards the use of more discrete modes of
estimation. The arguments for each are rehearsed below.
2.4.1 DISCRETE VERSUS CONTINUOUS LABOUR SUPPLY
The traditional approach to the modelling of labour supply
maintains that the decision variable, hours of work, is continuous
and unconstrained. Individuals are assumed to derive utility from
net household income C (shared between current and future
consumption) and leisure L = T-h. Let these preferences be
represented by
U = U(h,c;X), (16)
where X represents individual characteristics. Behavioural
decisions are constrained to lie within a budget set defined in
terms of gross wage rates w total household income /.z from assets
and other unearned sources, and the tax system T(h,w,#;X),
where h = T-L for some time endowment T. The budget set
takes the following general form
C = wh + # - T(h,wpX)- FC(Zc)
, (17)
where T(h,w,p;X) represents tax payments minus benefit
receipts, assumed to depend on hours, wages, unearned income
and household characteristics, and FC(Zc) represents the fixed
cost of employment for someone with characteristics Zc . One may
assume that households choose a point on the edge of their
budget set, which ignores the potential to save for future
consumption. Alternatively, one may replace income by current
consumption expenditure (if data are available) to make the model
consistent with a life-cycle behavioural pattern; see Blundell and
Walker (1986). In the standard continuous model households are
assumed to maximise (16) subject to (17) over a continuum of
hours. That is, desired hours h* for each household member stem
fronl the solution to the following problem
maxU(c,T-h)s.t. c <_ wh +# -T(h,w,#;X)-FC(Zc).    (18)
H
The maximisation problem is not straightforward, however,
because of the fundamentally non-linear character of the tax
function T[.) What tends instead to happen is that (18) is solved
for a constant marginal tax rate to recover parametric forms for the
Marshallian labour supply functions h* = h, It; X. The complexities
of the tax schedule are then dealt with in estimation (see, for
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example, Hausman and Ruud (1984); Hausman (1985); Moffitt
(1986) or Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998)).
However, in a number of recent studies analysts have begun to
examine policy issues using labour supply models which are
characterised by a more realistic discretised budget set.17 There are
a number of reasons for this. First, analysts increasingly question
whether a model which allows continuous substitution of hours for
leisure constitutes a realistic representation of the supply choices
open to the individual. For many socio-demographic groups labour
market participation takes the form of fixed wage-hours contracts,
with individuals choosing from among a discrete set of hours
combinations (most often at part-time levels of around 20 hours,
and at full-time levels of between 38 and 40 hours per week).
Second, there are statistical and practical reasons to favour a
discrete approach to the modelling of labour supply in preference
to more classical continuous models. These largely stem from the
difficulties associated with the treatment of non-linear budget
constraints in continuous estimation (see Gourieroux, Laffont, and
Montfort (1980) and Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1992)).
The strategy adopted in the discrete approach is to replace the
entire budget set with a finite number of points thereon, and
optimise only over those discrete points. The procedure supposes
that hours’ choices can be approximated by the discretised hours
level h(.)~ ~",h~,...,h’-~. according to the grouping role
= hi/fiT1B <h<h~
= hP-1/fhB_2 < h <_ hB 1
= he@ > h~_l,
giving P alternative values for h (.).’~ Household net incomes may
then be calculated for the set of discrete hours combinations h(.)
as
c[h(.)]= wh(.) q- 12- T(h(.),w,l~;X) for h(.)E {tl ,h
2 
..... hP }.
The household is assumed to maximise the following
lh,h .....I, I
17 See, for example, Bingley and Walker (1997); Callan and van Soest (1996);
Duncan and Giles (1996); Duncan and Weeks (1997); Keane (1995); Keane and
Moffitt (1998); van Soest (1995).
’~ For example, a five-state labour supply regime might be described by the choice
H1:;=5,Hl~=l~HE=25~ and H. Bset H(.)={0,10,20,30,40} where 1 2 3 4=3~’
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This approach removes from the optimisation problem many of
the complexities of a non-linear tax schedule, but at the cost of
introducing rounding errors in the hours levels used for estimation.
The degree of aggregation may therefore have a potentially
detrimental effect on the authenticity of the parameters estimated
under a discrete regime, and ought at the very least to be
subjected to sensitivity analysis.
2.4.2 ESTIMATING A DISCRETE MODEL OF LABOUR SUPPLY
IN REDUCED FORM
To operationalise the discrete choice model requires a
specification both of the preference function and of the stochastic
structure. A popular approach specifies directly a series of state-
specific utilities to be enjoyed in each discrete hours regime
h(.)  {h ,h2’...,hP}. Let state specific utilities be represented by
Uh(.) = Uh (Ch(.);Z,X ), (20)
where ch(.) represents the net household income that would be
enjoyed at h(.). Often, (20) is specified as a linear combination of
state-specific incomes and household characteristics, such that
Uh(.) = X’flh(.)+y.ch(.). Random disturbances are added to utilities
in each state of the world, leading to a stochastic utility
specification of the form
U*h(.)=X’flh(.)+y.ch(.)+eh(.),forh()=h ,h2’...,hP. (21)
By introducing stochastic structure, we are in a position to
derive probabilistic expressions for the likelihood of choosing any
labour market regime by application of the maximum utility
criterion (19). That is to say, the probability that the individual
works hJ ~ ~h’,h~,...,hr ~hours is
Pr(h(.) = hJ )= Pr[Uj* > Up* forall j ~ p,p~ {1 ..... P}]
=Pr[X’flM +Thj +e j > X’flhp+y.Chp+e pforallj¢: p] (22)
= Pr[ehp-e# <X’iO3#--flht,)--y.(ChP +~j>rallj, p]
We may estimate the parameters of (21) via a likelihood
formed from probabilities (22) for a sample of data once
assumptions are made about the distribution of random ,
components eh(.). 19 For example, if one assumes that each ehj in
,9 In fact, one can only identify P-1 sets of parameters flHO. Typically, a reference
of the world is chosen for which fl0 = 0.
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(21) is distributed as a Type I Extreme Value error, then
parameters may be estimated using standard Multinomial Logit
methods. Note that the probability (22) depends both on state-
invariant individual characteristics and state-varying characteristics
(specifically, net income at different hours levels).
One problem with this approach is the difficulty with which the
statistical model may be tested against economic theory. Since the
parameters of the utilities in each state are estimated
independendy, one cannot easily confirm that the preference
function itself is consistent with theory. Moreover, the number of
parameters multiplies in direct proportion to the number of distinct
labour market states, and in practice such models can yield
imprecisely determined parameters. This can make simulated
responses volatile. For this reason we see greater potential with a
more structural approach.
2.4.3 A BASIC STRUCTURAL MODEL OF LABOUR SUPPLY
A more structural approach to the modelling of household labour
supply behaviour derives from van Soest (1995) and Keane and
Moffitt (1998), both of whom model hours’ behaviour as the
outcome of a discrete choice among a finite set of hours’
alternatives. The approach allows both for random preference
heterogeneity and state-specific errors in perception, and can also
incorporate either directly estimated or indirectly imputed fixed
costs in estimation. To see the essence of their approach, let
gh(.) =u(r-h(.)~Ch(.);X
~ 
foF h(.)E ~-gl,h2 .....hP}, (23)
where the unified preference function now depends both on
(discrete) hours h(.) and income Ch(.). Compared with the discrete
approach, this method is parsimonious in its parameterisation and
preserves the same preference structure over the whole range of
hours. Random disturbances specific are added to utilities in each
state h(.)~ {hl,h2 ..... hp} as with the discrete approach to give
random utilities
Uho* = U(T - h(.), Ch(.); X)+ eh(.), (24)
where each 8h(.),h(.) ~ ~l,h2,...,hP} is assumed to be independently
distributed as a Type I Extreme Value. The probability of choosing
¯ state h(.) = hI is therefore
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Pr[(h(.) : hJ’) : Pr~Ja. > Up for all j * p.pe {1 ..... P}I
2.4.4 REFINEMENTS
(25)
Unobserved Wage Rates
In a typical sample of microdata, it is not possible to observe wage
rates for non-working individuals. This poses a problem when
simulating behavioural responses, since the budget constraint over
which the non-working individual is supposed to optimise requires
a value for the gross hourly wage rate. For practical
microsimulation it is necessaW to estimate the expected market
wage rate commanded by individuals with a given set of observed
characteristics. This conditional wage expectation is used in place
of missing data for non-workers in the continuous method of
microsimulation.2° Econometric methods also make it possible to
factor unobserved characteristics into this expectation, particularly -
those unobserved characteristics thought specifically to influence
the level of the market wage available to non-working individuals
in the sample.21 The method of estimating wage rates also offers
the possibility of repeatedly sampling from conditional wage
distributions in simulation, given pre-estimated expressions for
expected wage rates conditional on observed characteristics.
Modelling Non-participation
The participation decision is probably the hardest aspect of the
labour supply decision to get right. Yet the work incentive impact
at the point of participation is often the most important
consideration when assessing the incentive and welfare impact of
tax or benefit reform proposals.= For example, in the UK, the
Family Credit system of in-work support has seen three relatively
recent structural reforms, each of which has been designed with
the objective of encouraging participation.2~ Empirical evidence
suggests that the participation elasticity is large relative to
20 It is not appropriate to estimate earnings functions for use in behavioural
microsimulation, since such a function combines both hours choices and wage
rates, both of which are endogenous.
~’ In particular, methods of estimating conditional expectations which control for
sample selection are used; see Heckman (1979).
22 See Heckman (1993).
~ See Duncan and Giles (1996) for more detail on the histolT of reform to Family
Credits.
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conditional hours elasticities, suggesting a low reservation wage
for many groups.
Most microsinmlation studies of the impact of tax reform on
labour supply deal with participation simply by assuming that
reservation wages exceed the market wage available. However,
there is empMcal evidence suggesting that this corner "solution"
characterisation of non-participation is statistically unsustainable.2~
Other reasons for observing individuals out of the labour market
include involuntary unemployment, and potential participants
being discouraged from seeking work as a result of fixed costs or
search costs of employment. These affect the likelihood that a
potential worker will move into paid employment, and can be
controlled for in estimation. Hence, ideally they should also be
acconm~odated in microsimulation applications. Blundell, Ham,
and Meghir (1987) discuss a likelihood-based approach which
exploits sample information to differentiate those who are
unemployed but seeking work and those who are self-reported
non-participants, and Cogan (1981) describes a method to control
directly for fixed costs in estimation.
Perhaps the main reason why many microsimulation studies
adhered to the corner solution notion of non-participation is the
expectation that the tax and benefit reform should have some
impact on the likelihood of voluntary labour market participation.
The implementation of selection-type models to separate the
participation decision from the choice of hours, conditional on
participation, are consistent with fixed costs in estimation.
However, the participation decision is typically modelled in
reduced form, to the extent that the choice does not explicitly
depend on the full detail of the tax and benefit system.2s In
consequence, such models make an uneasy transition into
microsimulation, where tax and benefit changes ought explicitly to
affect participation decisions.
Some sources of microdata separately identify various types of
individuals not in paid employment. Some people report that they
are looking for work, some report that they want to work but are
not looking (including those who cite the need to care for children
as a reason for not looking), and some report that they do not
want to work. This information can be used to differentiate
individuals in estimation and simulation. Keane (1995) factors
exogenous child-related and fixed costs of work into his estimation
procedure, by netting from the household net income of working
families a state-specific average fixed cost. Callan and van Soest
(1996) introduce a method by which fixed costs may directly be
imputed in estimation. Specifically, by attributing to those who
a~ For example, see Mroz (1987).
2s There have been developments in the recent literature to factor some detail of
the tax and benefit system into a separate participation decision, but the level of
this detail is typically limited; see Bingley and Walker (1997), Blundell, Reed and
Stroker (1997) and Duncan and Giles (1998a).
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want to work but do not look for work an unobsetared (shadow)
fixed cost, and parameterising this cost in terms of obsetazable
characteristics and a random element, they were able to estimate a
"shadow fixed cost" equation. This equation was used in
microsimulation to eliminate the reservation wage condition most
commonly applied as an explanation of non-participation.26
Duncan and Giles (1998b) implement the Callan-van Soest
method in an application to UK data. They analyse the potential
labour market impact of the Working Families Tax Credit (W~C)
as a replacement for the UK Family Credit system of in-work
benefit, concentrating on the likely effect on single parent families.
They found that the imputation of fixed costs reduced significantly
the inertia in discrete microsimulation that is typically found at the
point of non-participation.
2.4.5 CHOICE OF MODE OF ESTIMATION
Whether using a continuous or a structural discrete mode of
estimation for an empirical model of labour supply, the successful
application of continuous behavioural microsimulation methods
requires a quantifiable model both for preferences over any
combination of net income and hours of work, and a model which
predicts the most preferred supply of hours for any combination of
marginal net wage rate and virtual income. Ideally, the empirical
model should also have the potential to factor fixed or child-
related work costs into the behavioural model. This serves to
eliminate the resel-vation wage condition in estimation, and also
offers an opportunity to sit-nulate tile behavioural impact of policy
reforms designed to compensate for expenditures on childcare.
Among the alternative estimation methods available, it is
suggested that the Keane-Moffitt approach is best suited to address
these various concerns. The reasons for this judgement are as
follows:
¯ The estimation strategy is consistent with the presence of
taxes.
¯ Observed and unobselazed heterogeneity is easily incorporated
in estimation.
¯ The behavioural model may be applied equally well to
continuous or discrete microsimulation.
¯ Fixed and child-related costs may be imputed in estimation
and altered in simulation. Stochastic elements of the
behavioural model may feasibly be factored into behavioural
microsimulation.
¯ Incomplete programme participation may be controlled for in
estimation and imputed in simulation.
a6 The advantage of the Callan-van Soest approach is that the fixed cost imputation
can be factored directly into either continuous or discrete behavioural
microsimulation.
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2.4.6 CHOICE OF FUNCTIONAL FORM
For continuous estimation a prime concern when choosing an
appropriate functional form for hours of work is the flexibility of
the potential behavioural responses, coupled with the availability
of manageable utility functions, either direct or indirect. It is rare to
find specifications which are flexible and which yield explicit
forms for both versions of utility; see Stern (1986). Most of the
more recent contributions to the continuous labour supply
literature have chosen ffmctional forms which are either quadratic
or log-linear in the marginal wage, and are linear in non-labour
income. Duncan (1993) introduced the variant of the semi-log
supply function described in Equation (8), which combines the
advantage of an explicit form for indirect utility with a degree of
flexibility in the income elasticity of labour supply.
For the implementation of the structural discrete approach, van
Soest and Callan and van Soest (1996) used a direct translog utility
function for ( 24 ) whereby
U(h,c)=czcclnc2 +ahh ln(T- h)2 +ad, lncln(T-h)+
p lnc+/3,,In(V-h) (26)
for some pre-specified value for the time endowment, T. Equation
(26) requires net household incomes, Ch(.) to be positive for all
hours alternatives. This may cause a problem if one chooses to net
fixed costs from household income in the estimation procedure, in
which case the difference can become negative for low-earning
households with high fixed costs. The quadratic direct utility
function is favoured by Keane and Moffitt (1998), where
U(h’c)=ctccc2 +°~""h2 +£tchCh + flcC + flhh (27)
for parameters ~ = IgZcc,ahh,a~h,fl~flh}. This function is tractable,
yet permits a wide range of possible behavioural responses; see
Stern (1986) for a discussion of the properties of this and other
functions.
Whether (26) or (27) is chosen, observed heterogeneity can be
introduced linearly through parameters tic and fib.
Specifically,
fie = ricO + fl’c X (28)
fl,, = fl,,o + fl’,,X (29)
In order to incorporate random preference heterogeneity, a subset
of the parameters in (27) may be randomised. For example, the
linear utility parameters, fl~ and fib, can be randomised, giving
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2.5
Solving for
Optimal
Labour Supply
P~ = ~c0 +/3’c x + vc (30)
3,, = 3,,0 + 3’,, x + v,,,(31)
where {vc,Vh} are assumed to be jointly normal with variances
{at,o-h}. The estimation of this model with random preference
heterogeneity requires simulation methods, either using a simple
method of Simulated Maximum Likelihood or the more complex
Method of Simulated Moments. Both methods were examined in
detail by Keane and Moffitt (1998), although they noted that the
simpler method is not unbiased for a finite number of Monte Carlo
draws.
When choosing a functional specification for direct utility, it is
necessary to have some regard to the application in hand. If the
principal concern is with continuous behavioural microsimulation,
then the main requirement is the flexibility and consistency of the
behavioural model, and the availability of tractable forms for the
various functions (direct and indirect utility and labour supply).
Given these criteria, the direct quadratic utility specification is
favoured.
2.5.1 A SOLUTION ALGORITHM FOR CONTINUOUS HOURS
The budget constraint, while typically highly non-linear, consists
of a number of piecewise linear sections, as identified using the
algorithm described in Section 2.2. Each section is associated with
a particular slope, the corresponding net wage, w, and virtual
income, #. The algorithm for determining the individual’s labour
supply involves investigating the local optima on linear sections
and corners of the budget constraint. The utility associated with
each local optimum is evaluated and the position giving the global
optimum is identified as the labour supply. The procedure is
described in the context of the labour supply function (8), but of
course applies to any legitimate form of function.
Consider Figure 2.3, which shows the first two linear sections,
AB and BC, of a budget constraint. The first section, AB, is associ-
ated with a net wage of w1 and virtual income of /-/l while the
second section, BC, is associated with w2 and #2 respectively.
The first step of the algorithm involves substituting the values w1
and #1 into the individual’s labour supply function (8). If the
resulting value of h is less than zero, then the corner solution at
point A is identified as a local optimum involving no work.
The evaluation of the utility associated with this point must be
obtained by first obtaining the virtual wage and virtual income
associated with the corner solution. The virtual income has
already been discussed above and in this case is simply given by
/./=/.z1 . The virtual wage is that which would generate the optimal
position as a tangency position. The approach at this non-working
corner involves setting h=O and, from (8), solving numerically
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Figure 2.3
D
hours
for the virtual wage is the value of w for which
o~+[31ogw+Yl.q/w=O.27 The concept of the virtual wage is
thesame as that of the virtual price used in the theory of rationing,
and stems from Hicks (1940). If it is known that the budget set is
convex, there is no need to look for other positions on the budget
constraint.
Alternatively, if the resulting value of h lies between points A
and B, then it is identified as a local maximum associated with a
tangency position of an indifference curve with that section of the
budget constraint; the level of utility can in this case be obtained
by direct substitution into the indirect utility function (13). Again, if
it is known that the budget set is convex, there is no need to look
for other positions on the budget constraint.
A third possibility is that the value of h obtained from the use
of w~ and /.t] lies to the right of B along the extension BD, in
which case no clear decision can be made until the next linear
section is investigated. The next stage therefore involves
substituting w2 and /.t2 into the labour supply function (8). If the
resulting value of h lies to the left of B along the extension EB, it
can be concluded that the corner, B, is indeed a local optimum.
Evaluation of the associated utility level requires the use of the
corresponding values of h and c at point B. But since only the
indirect form of the utility function is available, and values of w
and lz are not defined for corner solutions, it is necessary to obtain
the virtual values; these are the values of w and /.t that, if
associated with a tangency position, would place the individual at
the kink.
The two equations used to solve for the two unknowns, the
virtual wage and income, are the budget constraint and the labour
27 It is clear form the form of (8) that there is a unique value of w corresponding to
any given h.
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supply function. Substituting /.z = c-wh into (8), it is necessary to
solve numerically for the value of the virtual wage, the value of w
for which
0 + y)h = a + fl logw + ~’c (32)
W
Given the value of w the corresponding value of // is
obtained by substitution into the budget constraint. These two
values can then be substituted into the indirect utility function.
Alternatively, the value of h obtained from the use of w~ and
/q ,nay be between B and C, in which case it provides a local
optimum as a tangency solution. The associated utility level can be
calculated by the substitution of w~ and /.z~ into the indirect utility
function (13). If the budget set is known to be convex, there is no
need to look for other positions. But if the budget set is non-
convex, the procedure continues in this way by moving across the
complete budget constraint and identifying all local optima.
In general, the utility levels corresponding to tangency or
interior solutions are easily evaluated using the indirect utility
function, (13). Utility levels corresponding to corner solutions are
obtained by first calculating the virtual wage and virtual income for
the required values of c and h involving the numerical solution to
(32), and then substituting into the indirect utility function. The
global optimum is chosen as the local optimum giving the greatest
utility.2s
Figure 2.4
A’
hours
28 Cases where two positions give the same utility can arise in principle with non-
convex budget sets, but in practice the probability is negligible.
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Further examples showing more than one local optimum are
given in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. These figures show the associated
indifference curves, but it is important to recognise that such
indifference curves are in practice not used and would be very
cumbersome to trace out, in view of the fact that the direct utility
function cannot be derived explicitly.
Figure 2.5
hours
2.5.2 A SOLUTION ALGORITHM FOR DISCRETE HOURS
For a discrete choice model of labour market status of the form
described in (25) there is inevitably less accuracy both in the
budget constraint information brought to bear in estimation and in
the microsinmlated hours responses to a tax policy reform.
Specifically, hours’ responses are limited in accuracy to the
number of discrete hours bands into which the simulation sample
is divided, and the nominal value for hours of work allocated to
observations falling within each band. This may be appropriate for
certain demographic groups, such as married male workers, and
certain tax reforms, but it is by no means a universally acceptable
feature. It is known, for example, that the labour market decisions
of one-parent households are relatively marginal or flexible,
reflecting the high value such households place on non-work time.
It is therefore desirable to extend both estimation and simulation
methods for such groups to embrace a wider set of hours
alternatives and a variety of reasons for non-participation.
However, such households tend to have more complex budget
constraints than most, so the estimation of continuous hours
models is particularly problematic and prone to bias. This leaves
one alternative, which is to estimate a discrete choice model based
upon a large number of labour market states, of the form
described in, say, Callan and van Soest (1996).
The methods by which discrete models of labour market status
are applied to discrete microsimulation are to some extent under-
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developed. One approach is to restrict attention to aggregated
groups in the simulation sample and to summarise probabilities of
occupation of each discrete state before and after some policy
reform. This tends to conceal the impact of reform at the individual
level, making it difficult to assess how the behaviourally-adjusted
cost of the reform might be judged, and the impact of a reform
targeted either at a specific demographic group or over a specific
range of hours.29
If, on the other hand, simulated responses at the level of the
individual are required, it is not obvious which is the most
appropriate strategy to adopt. In continuous microsimulation, the
optimal hours before and after a policy reform are solved and fed
back into a static microsimulation model to generate behaviourally
adjusted costings and distributional results. This raises the question
of what parallel approach might be adopted using discrete models.
It is common to see discrete microsimulated responses based
on a maximum probability rule as a "one-shot" or "all-or-nothing"
mode of individual allocation, disregarding the probabilistic nature
of the model specification. This approach is wasteful of
information, and it can be demonstrated that the maximum
probability rule method of sinmlating labour market transitions is
biased, particularly in discrete models where some states are either
sparsely or densely represented in the sample.3° A second strategy
is to respect the probabilistic form of the discrete model by basing
the behavioural simulation directly on predicted state probabilities.
For a simple two-state model this strategy is relatively
straightfolward. SupposePio^ ~ and/3/~ represent predicted
probabilities for two labour market states (of work or non-work,
say) for the ith individual under some base system, B. Further, let
^B         ^B
Pio andPil     represent equivalent probabilities under a reformed
tax system, R. The correct transitions probabilities are
P/(0-~0) =min{/3iB,/3i~ } (33)
^R ^B
Pi(0~,)--lb~ > PioI(P,o- Pio^a ) (34)
^B ^R ^R ^B
P(1-->0) =l~i°<Pio]’(Pio-Pio) (35)
P/(l-->l) =min{/3i{,/31{ } (36)
In other words, it is necessaW only to difference the two state
probabilities in order to obtain a correct measure of the probability
of transition. Only one of the off-diagonal transitions probabilities
can be non-zero. However, it is difficult to extend these formulae
to higher dimensional problems. Suppose, for example, that a
29 One might think, for example, of a reform to in-work support along the lines of
the US EITC (see Sholz 1996 ) or the new WFTC in the UK (see HM Treasury
(1998)).
30 see Duncan and Weeks (1998).
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matrix of transitions probabilities for a five-state labour supply
model is required. The conditional integrals which underpin the
formulations (33) to (36) become practically insoluble in multiple
dimensions. It is tempting to form a matrix of transition
probabilities simply using the arithmetic product of predicted state
probabilities pre-and post-reform. Hence, for example, ^B^RPioPio
would become the joint probability that state 0 is chosen both
before and after the reform. However, this formulation is incorrect
because it assumes inappropriately that the probabilities are
independent. A way of extending (33) to (36) to higher dimensions
is by the following computationally time-consuming method.
Apply resampling methods to draw repeated realisations of the
stochastic elements of the discrete choice nlodel (which, in the
case of Duncan and Giles (1998) or Keane and Moffitt (1998)
would involve draws from Type I Extreme Value and Multivariate
Nomaal distributions for, respectively, state specific errors and
random taste parameters).
Apply the so-called "maximum probability" rule to allocate
each individual to the most probable state following each random
draw. Averaging these resampled transitions frequencies to arrive
at a simulated version of (33) to (36) in higher dimensions.
2.5.3 AN EXAMPLE: MODELLING THE IMPACT OF TAX
CREDITS IN THE UK
The system of in-work support currently in place in the UK is
known as Family Credit (FC), and is designed to provide support
for low wage families with children who are working. Once
someone in a family with children works more than 16 hours a
week, they become eligible for FC. Each family is potentially
eligible to a maximum amount, depending on the number of
children in the household and a small addition if they work full
time. Currently, the maximum level of FC comprises a weekly
adult credit of £48.80 and child credits starting at £12.35 per child
for children under 11. This maximum amount is payable if the
family’s net income (after income tax and National Insurance
Contributions) is lower than a threshold (£79.00 per week in 1998-
1999). Net income in excess of this threshold reduces entitlement
to FC from the naaximum by 70p for every £1 of excess income.
As a topical illustration of the method of discrete behavioural
microsimulation, we summarise the results of a recent study into
the incentive impact of a proposal to replace Family Credit with a
new Working Families Tax Credit (W-ffFC).3’ The WFTC will
~’ Tim UK government announced in the March 1998 Budget that Family Credit
was to be replaced by a new income tax credit to be known as the Working
Families Tax Credit (WFTC). The WFTC can be summarised as a more generous
version of FC with an altered method of payment. A full discussion of the work
incentive impact of WFTC can be found in Duncan and Giles (1998b).
BEHAVIOURAL MICROSIMULATION METHODS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS49
increase the generosity of in-work support relative to the FC
system in three ways,32 through
1. an increase in the credit for children under 11 from £12.35 to
£14.85 per child;
2. an increase in the threshold from £79 to £90 per week;
3. a reduction in the taper from 70 to 55 per cent.
A stylised comparison of the structure of ~C with FC is
shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6
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Simulated Responses to the WFTC
Tables 2.2 to 2.4 report simulations for single parent households,
women with employed partners and women with unemployed
partners. These results are presented in the form of a matrix of
simulated transitions between non-participation (NP), discouraged
workers (DW), and hours’ ranges 1-10, 11-20, 21-30 and 31-40
using the resampling method of discrete behavioural
microsimulation described in the previous section. We see no
offsetting movements out of the labour market. To take account of
sampling variability, a standard error of 0.42 per cent simulated
around this figure, which would admit the possibility that the
actual increase could be as much as 3 per cent.
Among one-parent households (see Table 2.2), the most
common simulated transition takes around 2.2 per cent of the
sample from no work to either part-time or full-time work to take
advantage of the increased generosity of WFTC at part-time hours.
We see no offsetting movements out of the labour market. To take
account of sampling variability, a standard error of 0.42 per cent
sinmlated around this figure, which would admit the possibility -
that the actual increase could be as much as 3 per cent.
32 Although there will be an additional childcare tax credit of up to £105 per week
for those who pay for some form of formal childcare.
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For married women the simulated incentive effect is quite
different. Table 2.3 presents resuhs which suggest a significant
overall reduction in the number of women in work of around
0.57 per cent, equating to a grossed-up figure of around 20,000 in
the population. This overall reduction comprises around 0.2 per
cent who move into the labour market following the reform, and
0.8 per cent who move from work to non-participation. The
predominant negative response is clearly not one that is intended,
and stems fi’om a proportion of non-working women whose
low earning partners will be eligible for the WVFC. The greater
generosity of the tax credit relative to the current system of Family
Credit increases household income. This increase in income would
be lost if the won:an in the household were to work. And for
those women currently in the labour market, the WFTC increases
the income available to the household if she were to stop working.
Table 2.4 reports a predominantly positive work incentive
response to the WFTC among women whose partners do not
work. The rationalisation of this result is the same as for the single
parent group.
Table 2.2: Simulated Response to WFTC Reform: One-parent Households
Pre-                                       Post-Reform
Reform NP* DW** 1-10 11-20 21-30
NP* 29.66 1.81
DW** 26.53 0.68 0.81
1-10 8.56 0.11 0.15
11-20 9.93 0.10
21-30 0.05 9.62
31-40 " ,0.11 0.06
Col. Perc. "" 10.87 " "~0".73 ;ii ~ ""
Notes:: cell entries represent percentages. Transitions tables are built by drawing 100 times from the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity and allocating each observation to the cell which yields maximum utility for each
draw. Standard deviations for each transitions cell and summary measure are simulated by drawing 100 times
fl’om the estilnated asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates, and for each of those 100 parameter
draws, applying the method described above to build transitions matrices.
* Non-participation.
** Discouraged Wo,ker.
31-40 Row
Percentage
¯ 3i .47
0.71 28.73
0.14 8.96
0.11 10.14
0.03 9.70
10184
Table 2.3: Simulated Response to WFTC: Women in Couples
Pre-                                      Post-Reform
Reform NP* DW** 1-10 11-20 21-30
NP* 22.24 0.17
DW** 0.54 9.29 0.04 0.06 0.06
1-10 0.14 15.26 0.02 0.01
11-20 0.19 0.02 16.32 0.01
21-30 0.22 0.03 0.01 17,11
31-40 0.22 0.04 0.03 0.01
CoI.Perc, 22.79 10.23 15~39 16.45 : 17,20
Notes:: ;Is fox" Table 2.2.
(partner employed)    ,
31-40 Row
22.4i
0.04 10.03
0.11 15.45
0.11 16.55
0.03 17.38
17.90 18.19
J 7;95. 1 O0
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Table 2.4: Simulated Response to WFTC: Women in Couples (partner unemployed)
Pre- Post-Reform
Reform NP* DW** 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 Row
Percentage
NP* 37.39 1.09 38.49
DW** 0:02 18.27, 0.01 0.40 0.50 0.43 19.61
1-10 12.86 0.09 0.14 0.10 13.19
11-20 9.26 0.05 0.06 9.38
21-30 0.01 8.81 0.03 8.86
31-40 0.01 0.12 0.03 10.32 10.47
Col. Perc. 37.41 19.37 ¯ 12.87 9.88 9.53 10.93 100
Notes: as for Table 2.2.
2.5.4 ACCOUNTING FOR PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY IN
SIMULATION
When examining the labour supply effects of a change in the
tax and transfer system, it may sometimes be convenient to ensure
that the pre-change optimal choice of each individual, given the
estimated labour supply function, correspond to the choice actually
made. This is particularly the case when the analysis of a policy
reform invites a comparison of static and behavioural costings and
distributional results. However, the parameters of the labour
supply function are expressed as functions of a wide range of
individual and demographic characteristics. The values assigned to
a particular type of person are based on the conditional expected
values, so there is no guarantee that the optimal choice of any
individual of that type corresponds to the actual choice. The
required correspondence can be obtained by interpreting any
difference between observed and predicted hours under an
incumbent tax system as individual random preference
heterogeneity, and factoring this term back into the underlying
preference structure as an individual-specific parameter. This is
obviously a strong assumption, given the range of reasons for a
difference between observed and predicted behaviour. However, it
provides a useful benchmark against which more sophisticated
stochastic structures might be compared. Moreover, the manner by
which such correspondence can be brought about depends on
whether the method of behavioural simulation is continuous or
discrete.33
33 Bkmdell, Meghir, Symons, and Walker (1986) describe a method to calibrate
hours in continuous behavioural microsimulation. For discussion of the problems
of calibration in discrete microsimulation, see Duncan and Weeks (1998).
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2.6
Simulating
Welfare
Changes
Since each individual’s expenditure function, I.t~w,U), is obtained
as part of the process of determining optimal labour supply,
"exact" measures of welfare change resulting from a tax change
can be calculated in a relatively straightforward way.34 This is
because welfare changes are defined directly in terms of
expenditure functions.
A change in the net wage rate, resulting from a tax change,
affects both the effective price of leisure and the value of virtual
income. Welfare changes are therefore more complicated than in
tim context of a price change for a standard commodity.
2.6.1 EQUIVALENT VARIATIONS
Consider a change in the tax system such that the net wage and
the value of virtual income for an individual change from w° and
/.to to w1 and #1. The equivalent variation, EVis given by
The absolute value of the first term in curly brackets in the above
expression corresponds to an area to the left of a Hicksian
(compensated) leisure demand curve between appropriate
"prices", and clearly #lwl,U’)=#’. As mentioned above, the
expenditure function and hence the equivalent variation could
alternatively be expressed in terms of full income, M = # + wT,
rather than the non-wage income, # where, as before, T is the
individual’s total endowment of time. The equivalent variation in
(37) is expressed such that it is positive for a welfare loss. The
dead-weight loss arising from the tax structure change is thus the
sum over all individuals of the equivalent variations, less the
increase in aggregate tax revenue.
Consider the use of the labour supply function given by (8).
Suppose that the pre-change optimal position for an individual is
at a tangency position on a section of the budget constraint having
a net wage and virtual income of w° and #0 respectively. These
values can easily be substituted into the indirect utility function,
(13) in order to obtain the pre-change utility level, U° = VIw°, #o).
/
This tangency position is illustrated in Figure 2.7. If a change in
the tax and transfer system causes the individual to move to
another tangency position, associated with a net wage and virtual
income of w1 and /./1 respectively, then U1 = V(wl,#1).
The calculation of the equivalent variation involves substituting
w° and U1 into the expenditure function given by (12) to get
#1w°,U1). Hence the equivalent variation can easily be obtained
~ Each individual has a unique expenditure function in view of the adjustment of
the constant term, described above.
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from (37). Alternatively, suppose that the change in the tax and
transfer system causes the individual to move to a corner solution,
for example the point B1 in Figure 2.8. This could occur from an
increase in the marginal tax rate over the range.
It is then necessary to compute the virtual wage and income
w1 and #1 which define a linear budget constraint that would
place the individual at B~ as a tangency solution. It is then
possible to proceed as before, by obtaining U1 =V(w1,1.ll)and
substituting w° and U1 into the expenditure function (12), to get
]./(w°,U1). Finally, the equivalent variation is obtained from (37).
An important implication of this example is that any tax change
that places the individual at point B1 has the same effect on the
equivalent variation. For example, further changes in the particular
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marginal tax rate that affects just the slope of the section BtC~
have no effect, so long as the corner remains fixed and is the
optimal position.35 This is because the virtual wage and income do
not change.
However, a change to a marginal tax rate that applies to lower
income ranges affects the position of the kink, B1 which in turn
causes the virtual income and virtual wage to change. Such a
change may simply cause the point B1 to shift upwards or
downwards, and so may leave labour supply unchanged. The
method of computing equivalent variations in cases where the
individual is initially at a corner solution follows the same kind of
procedure as described above, except that the initial utility level is
not actually required.
However, all the values of virtual incomes and wages required
for the evaluation of welfare changes will typically already have
been computed as part of the process of working out the
individual’s optimal labour supply. Thus the welfare changes can
be obtained at very little extra cost.
2.6.2 SOCIAL EVALUATIONS
Using the procedures described above, a behavioural
tnicrosimulation model can be used to evaluate the detailed
welfare effects on each different household of a policy change. In
some cases, it may be required to provide an overall evaluation of
a change in the tax structure. Such an evaluation can be carried
out using a specified social welfare function that reflects explicit
value judgements. In "static" models, the welfare function is often
based on incomes, although in view of the allowance for labour
supply behaviour, it may be desired to allow for the utility from
leisure. In some cases, social welfare functions are specified in
terms of utilities; this is usual in optimal tax studies. It should be
recognised that the results may depend on the particular
cardinalisation of the utility function that is used.
It has also been suggested that welfare functions can be
expressed in terms of money metric utility, defined as the value of
income, me, which, at some reference set of prices, Pr gives the
same utility as the actual income. In terms of the indirect utility
function, me is therefore defined by the equation
V(p,.,me)= V(p,m)            3S)
Using the expenditure or cost function gives
me = E(P,.,V(p,rn)) (39)
35 This would not be true of compensating variations, which require the
expenditure function to be evaluated for w~ and U° .
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This may be written as me = F(p,.,p,m)t The use of such a money
metric was explored in detail by King (1983), who called me
"equivalent income" and F the equivalent income function. An
advantage of the equivalent income concept is that comparisons
are made using a fixed set of reference prices, and it does not
depend on the cardinalisation of utility functions used. In the
special case where pre-reform prices are used as reference prices,
1 _m1then me -EV where the superscript refers to the post-change
value.
The effect on a specified social welfare or evaluation function
of a change in prices and incomes can be measured in terms of a
change in the distribution of equivalent incomes. Values of the
social welfare function can be calculated for a population group
0 and Iusing a complete distribution of values of me      me so that,
according to the value judgements implicit in the welfare function,
a change can be judged in terms of its overall effect.
Instead of starting with an explicit form of the social welfare
function, an initial analysis :night, for example, first examine the
0 and 1generalised Lorenz curves for the distributions of me      me tO
see if standard "dominance" results apply; for a statement of the
various dominance conditions available, see Lambert (1993). These
give comparisons of social welfare involving a minimum of
assumptions about the precise form of welfare function. If these
results do not provide a complete ordering of the distributions,
then fully specified welfare functions can be evaluated using the
distribution of equivalent incomes. Consider, for example, the use
of a social welfare function defined in terms of equivalent
incomes, such that welfare per person, W is given by
(40)
where e is the degree of constant relative inequality aversion of
the judge. This has the abbreviated form, expressed in terms of the
arithmetic mean, Ne, and Atkinson’s inequality measure, IA of
equivalent income, given by
(41)
This conveniently reflects the trade-off between mean
equivalent income and its equality, or what is often referred to as
the trade-off between "equity and efficiency", that the judge finds
acceptable. Alternative forms of the welfare function may of course
be used. For example, welfare rationales are available for the use
of (41) along with the Gini inequality measure or extended Gini
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measure substituted for the Atkinson inequality measure.36 In
practice it would be useful to examine the implications of adopting
a range of value judgements.
A potential difficulty with this approach arises from the fact that
the equivalent income function is not guaranteed to be concave,
leading to the problem that its use in a social welfare function
could lead the latter to favour disequalising transfers. This was
investigated in detail by Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), who
showed that concavity requires quasi homotheticityff Blackorby,
Laisney and Schmachtenberg (1994) also showed that welfare
prescriptions using this approach are not necessarily independent
of the reference prices used.
2.7
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide an introduction to
behavioural microsimulation modelling. Alternative methods of
simulating labour supply responses to changes in direct taxes and
benefits were discussed, concentrating on those factors which
influence the choice of a continuous or a discrete mode of
estimation or simulation. The ease with which fixed costs, child-
related costs and incomplete programme participation may be
factored into the microsimulation process formed a major criterion.
It was suggested that, for estimation, the structural discrete
choice approach developed by Keane and Moffitt (1998) offers
the greatest potential for behavioural microsimulation. In
particular, the Keane-Moffitt method allows for the direct
estimation of preference functions in a manner consistent with the
presence of taxes and incomplete welfare programme
participation. The model easily extends to household preference
structures, as for example in van Soest (1995). Their model may
also be augmented along the lines suggested in Callan and van
Soest (1996) to impute a fixed costs component in estimation. This
is a highly desirable extension to the basic method, since it avoids
the corner-solution or reservation wage characterisation of non-
participation which represented a major problem with previous
microsimulation methods. A second reason for favouring this style
of model specification is that, despite estimating the model as a
discrete choice, one may equally well apply discrete or continuous
microsimulation techniques using the same underlying preference
structure.
Stochastic elements in the econometric specification may be
factored into the behavioural microsimulation in a number of
ways. For continuous microsimulation methods the model may be
calibrated to replicate observed behaviour under the assumption
that errors may be interpreted as random preference heterogeneity.
On alternative abbreviated welfare functions, see Lambert (1993).
37 Homothetic utility functions are positive monotonic transformations of linear
homogeneous utility functions for which U(Ox)=OU(x).
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For discrete methods of microsimulation a similar calibration may
be achieved with suitable draws from the conditional distribution
of stochastic elements in the model specification.
These recent developments have provided fresh impetus to the
development of realistic and accurate behavioural microsimulation
methods, particularly at the point of non-participation. This opens
the way for detailed and authentic analysis of policy reform
options at the micro level.
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3. FAMILY IABOL  SUPPLY
AND PROPOSED TAX
REFORMS IN THE
NEIImRLCNDS
Arthur van Soest, Marcel Das
3.1
Introduction
This paper aims at analysing the effects of the proposed reform
of the income tax rules in the Netherlands on labour supply of
married or cohabiting couples. Static neo-classical models of labour
supply which can be used to analyse tax reforms have been used
by, for example, Hausman (1985), Hausman and Ruud (1984) and
Moffitt (1986, 1990a). These models are fully structural, in the sense
that they completely identify preferences of leisure versus
consumption. They allow, in principle, for an analysis of the effects
on labour supply of any permanent change in the tax roles.
Moreover, participation and hours worked are jointly treated as the
outcome of the same utility maximisation problem. This means that
the effects on participation and the effects on hours worked can be
jointly analysed. This makes these models a useful tool for policy
analysis in spite of apparent drawbacks such as their static nature.1
In the traditional Hausman (1985) model for individual labour
supply, and in the labour supply model for married couples in
Hausman and Ruud (1984), the budget set is piece-wise linear and
convex. The utility maximisation problem can be solved from the
first order conditions using Lagrange multipliers. Using the dual
approach, the empirical models in these articles use an explicit
expression for the labour supply function and the indirect utility
function. An easy algorithm to find the solution is available, which
is guaranteed to converge if preferences are quasi-concave (see
Blomquist, 1983). This approach has been applied fruitfully to
analyse labour supply in many countries. See, for example, all six
studies in Moffitt (1990b). Still, it has some drawbacks. First, solving
’ See BlundeI1 (1994) and Card (1994) for surveys of labour suppiy models in a
dynamic (life cycle) context, and Heckman (1993) for a critical discussion of the
state of this art.
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the model becomes substantially more complicated if the budget
set is not convex or piece-wise linear. In practice, this is an
important limitation, due to, for example, fixed costs, benefits, tax
allowances depending on whether the partner works or not,
thresholds in social security premiums, etc. To account for non-
convexities, either a restrictive functional form has to be used
which allows for explicit expressions for both the direct and the
indirect utility function, or ad boc features are added to the model,
for example explaining the choice between working and not
working.
Second, quasi-concavity of preferences has to be imposed a
priori. Together with functional form assumptions on the utility
function, this implies that prior restrictions are imposed. For
restrictive functional forms (such as a linear labour supply curve)
¯ this may mean that elasticities are to a large extent driven by these
assumptions, instead of being the outcome of the estimations. See
the discussion in MaCurdy et al. (1990).
These drawbacks can be overcome by approximating the choice
set by a finite subset of its points. For example, the assumption that
an individual can choose any number of working hours on the
interval [0,80] (with corresponding net incomes), can be replaced
by the assumption that the individual can only choose from
{0,4,8,12,...,80} (with corresponding net incomes). The choice set
then consists of 21 points instead of a continuum of points. The
utility maximum can be obtained by comparing the 21 values of the
(direct) utility function. This simply boils down to finding the
maximum of 21 values. It does not require first order conditions,
etc., and it does not rely on convexity or piece-wise linearity of the
budget set or quasi-concavity of preferences. Models for individual
labour supply with discrete choice sets have been used by, for
example, Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Tummers and Woittiez
(1991), and van Soest et al. (1990).
A discrete choice labour supply model for couples, with a
stochastic specification similar to that of a multinomial logit model,
has been introduced by van Soest (1995). Further refinements of
this model, for example allowing for fixed costs of working, and
using information on actual as well as desired hours of work, have
been introduced in some subsequent papers, see for example
Callan and van Soest (1996) and Euwals and van Soest (1999).
This discrete choice framework with multinomial logit type
errors is also the basis of the current paper. We assume that the
two spouses have a common utility function. We use a direct
quadratic translog utility function with arguments, family income,
leisure of the husband, and leisure of the wife. We allow for
preference variation across households. This is achieved by making
several parameters of the utility function dependent on
characteristics such as age and family composition. We include
separate error terms in the values of the utility function at all points
of the choice set, with the same specification as in the multinomial
logit model.
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To explain why there are relatively few people with a part-time
job, we incorporate fixed costs of work. These fixed costs are again
allowed to depend upon observed and unobserved characteristics
of the family and its members. We allow for different fixed costs
functions for husbands and wives. The fixed costs are fully
integrated in the structural model: they are subtracted from family
income of workers, and thus enter the utility function through
income. Increasing fixed costs will lower the income if working,
and will thus make not working relatively more attractive compared
to working assuming that utility increases with income.
We assume that before tax hourly wage rates do not vary with
hours worked. This assumption is maintained in most of the neo-
classical labour supply models, though there are exceptions, such
as Moffitt (1984), Tummers and Woittiez (1991), and Ilmakunnas
and Pudney (1990). Thus each individual has a unique before tax
wage rate. Together with hours worked and the tax system, the
before tax wage rate determines net earnings. A common problem
in labour supply models with non-workers is that wage rates of
non-workers are not observed. To account for this, a wage
equation is estimated, and wage predictions are constructed for
non-workers. Due to the non-linear nature of the labour supply
model, however, replacing wage rates by their predictions leads to
inconsistent estimates, even if the wage predictions themselves are
unbiased. To account for this, wage rate prediction errors are
explicitly incorporated in the model, as additional unobserved error
terms.
The labour supply model is based upon the assumption that
individuals or couples maximise (joint) utility, and thus aims at
estimating preferences of those who supply labour. It is therefore
estimated using information on desired hours of work, so that
deviations between desired and actual hours of work - due to, for
example, involuntary unemployment or a lack of part-time jobs -
are allowed for.
The model is estimated on data from the 1995 wave of the
Netherlands’ Socio-Economic Panel, which, at least for our
purposes, is representative of the Dutch polSulation. To account for
the various unobserved error terms, the model is estimated with
smooth simulated maximum likelihood: the likelihood function is
replaced by an approximation based upon simulation, and the
simulated approximation of the likelihood is maximised. The
estimator is asymptotically equivalent to exact maximum likelihood.
The results are used to set up a micro-simulation model for
analysing the sensitivity of labour supply for financial incentives.
First, participation rates and average hours worked are computed
on the basis of the estimates and the actual wages and tax rules.
Second, the simulation is repeated for different alternative
scenarios. Increasing all wage rates of husbands or wives by the
same percentage leads to estimates of own and cross wage
elasticities of both spouses. The focus of the simulations is the
analysis of labour supply effects of changing the income tax rules.
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Proposals for substantial revisions of the tax system, including
detailed plans for changing the income tax rules, have recently
been published by the Dutch govermnent (Ministry of Finance,
1997). These plans have played a major role in the recent policy
debate at the time of the general elections of 1998. Currently, a
revised and more specific version of these plans is proposed by the
government. The proposals suggest, for example, to change tax
free allowances and marginal tax rates in such a way that the
income difference between working and not working would
increase. This should help to stimulate participation and improve
the working of the labour market. Moreover, several measures have
been proposed which change the tax treatment of two earner
versus one earner families. For women whose husbands work full-
time, the current system creates a disincentive to work part-time or
full-time, and thus it stimulates non-participation of married
females. On the other hand, special treatment of married women
who earn less than about one-third of the annual minimum wage
for a full-time job, means that the current system does not create a
disincentive for married women to work only a few hours per
week. This feature is not shared by the proposed reform, which
therefore makes small part-time jobs less attractive. Our discrete
¯ choice framework is particularly convenient to analyse the effects
of this type of change, since it allows us to take account of the
complete structure of the tax system. We disentangle the effect on
the number of people who want small part-time jobs, large part-
time jobs, and full-time jobs, and also look at the consequences for
total labour supply.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we
describe the data. The labour supply model is discussed in Section
3.3. In Section 3.4, we discuss the results and the labour supply
elasticities. Section 3.5 briefly compares the actual (1998) tax
system with the proposed reform which we want to analyse. In
Section 3.6 we discuss the outcomes of our analysis of the labour
supply effects of this reform. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2
Data
The data are drawn from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP).
This is a panel consisting of about 5,000 households, which is
representative for the Dutch population excluding people living in
nursing homes, etc. We have used the wave drawn in May 1995.
We focus on married or cohabiting couples in the age group 16-64.
We classify the individuals into four groups according to their
labour market status: not available (NA), voluntarily unemployed,
involuntarily unemployed, and employed. The category NA consists
of students; persons receiving full-time disability benefits; persons
receiving pensions or other retirement benefits; and persons in
mandatory military service. Labour supply of people in this
category is not explained by our model. Their spouse’s labour
supply behaviour, however, is. analysed. This explains why the
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numbers of men and women in the SEP sample used in the
analysis are different: 1,948 men, 2,069 women.
The group of employed individuals includes everybody with a
paid job who is not in the category NA. It includes those with a
part-time job looking for additional work. On the other hand, it
excludes, for example, students with a job one day per week, who
are in categoW NA. The distinction between involuntary and
voluntary unemployment is based upon sample information on
search behaviour. The requirement for involuntary unemployment
is that an individual claims to be seriously looking for work, or has
applied for a job at least once in the past two months. For people
in involuntary unemployment, desired hours of work are positive,
for those in voluntary unemployment, they are zero.
Earnings in the SEP are measured as gross ea,’nings in the year
1994, retrieved from the respondents’ tax files. These earnings can
only be used to compute an hourly wage rate for the job held at
the time in the survey in May 1995 for people who have not
changed jobs in 1994 or from January 1995 until May 1995. For
those who did change jobs in that period, earnings are set to
missing.
The sample contains information on actual as well as desired
hours worked. Desired hours of workers are based upon the survey
question "How many hours per week would you like to work, for
your current hourly wage?" In SEP 1995, this is only asked if
respondents are considering changing jobs, however. For those
who are not looking for another job, it is assumed that desired
hours are equal to actual hours. Job searchers are simply asked
how many hours they would like to work.
Table 3.1 presents some sample characteristics for the men and
women in our sample. Since we have excluded students and
disabled people and focus on couples, the employment and
unemployment rates cannot be compared to the corm~nonly
published figures. The sample participation rate of men is quite
large, and involuntary unemployment is very low. Non-
participation among married women in the Netherlands is still
substantial, but has fallen substantially duririg the past two decades.
The positive differences between means of desired and actual
hours are due to involuntary unemployment.
3.3
Model
We present a static neo-classical structural labour supply model.
The framework is similar to that of Van Soest (1995). We only
consider people with a spouse (married or cohabiting). They are
assumed to maximise a joint utility function for the couple, taking
account of their own and their spouse’s leisure, and of family
income.
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3.3.1 UTILITY
We specify a direct utility function in which utility depends on
one’s own working hours (b), on total net income (y), and on
working hours of the partner (bp). Net income includes asset
income, the partner’s income and child allowances, but earnings of
other household members are excluded. The model would be
consistent with utility maximisation in a life cycle framework with
intertemporally additive preference if y could be replaced by total
expenditures (see Blundell and Walker, 1986). Due to lack of data
on consumption expenditures, however, we could not do this.
Table 3.1: Sample Statistics
Age
Education Level
Gross WageRate (dfl,
per hour)
Actual Number
of Hours Worked
(per week)
Desired Number
of Hours Worked
(per week)
Labour Market
Status
Nch0-18 (number Of "
children, aged
0-18years)
D ch0-5 (Dummy
Children 0 -5
years)
Men                Women
Mean 41.1 40.0
Lower 25.4 % 41.1%
Intermediate 47.6 % 40:3 .%
Higher
¯ 24.6% ..... 15:9 %
Unknown 2.4 % 2.7 %
- ’3-1.51 .........Mean 23.64’
Mean
Mean
Employed
39.63 ¯ 14.13. "
40.05 15.37
93.7 %
Involuntarily Unemployed 2.6 %
Voluntarily Unemployed 3.7 %
Mean 1.16
27.3 %
6.4 %
34.4 %
1:08
25~5 %
Child Allowance Mean
Total 1,948. 2,069
Note:/vlarried and cohabiting people only (age group 16-64). Those who are not available for the labour market
(students, disabled, retired) are excluded.
FAMILY LABOUR SUPPLY AND PROPOSED TAX REFORMS IN THE NETHERLANDS 65
We take the direct utility function quadratic in logarithms:2
U(v) = vlAv + b1, v = (logy,log(80-h),log(80-hp))1 (1)
Without any restrictions on the parameters, this utility function is
locally second order flexible. In principle there is no reason to
prefer this utility function to any other direct utility function with
the same (or larger) flexibility. We impose parameter restrictions to
guarantee that utility decreases with h and hp and increases with
income.3 We do not impose quasi-concavity of preferences, and
thus avoid the critique by MaCurdy et al. (1990).
The time endowment is fixed and set equal to 80 hours per
week.4 We follow the bulk of the labour supply literature, in which
the difference between the time endowment and hours worked is
usually called leisure time, but actually comprises an aggregate of
all time use categories except for paid work.
A is a 3x3 matrix of unknown parameters and b is a three-
dimensional vector. We assume that b2 and b3 depend on individual
or household characteristics, i.e., we allow for variation of
preferences across the sample through observed characteristics: b~ =
X’/3w k=2,3, where X are observed characteristics (age of husband
and wife, number of children, dummy for the presence of children
younger than 6). We also included unobserved characteristics
(reflecting unobserved heterogeneity of preferences), but the
variance of the corresponding error term was estimated to be zero.
Husband and wife are assumed to maximise the same utility
function, although, of course, in our notation, hours (h) of one
spouse are hours of the partner (lop) for the other. The labour
supply decision is thus modelled at the household level, as in, for
example, Hausman and Ruud (1984) and van Soest (1995). A more
general framework would be a game theoretic model with different
utility functions for the two spouses (see Kooreman and Kapteyn,
1990, for example). The intra household decision making process,
however, is beyond the purpose of the current paper.
3.3.2 CONSTRAINTS
The answer to the question: "how many hours would you like to
work?" is based upon utility maximisation under constraints. An
obvious constraint is the budget restriction: to each choice of the
number of working hours of husband and wife corresponds a
different net income. Moreover, we assume that respondents take
the actual working hours of their partner as given.
2 For notational convenience, the index for the household is dropped.
Vlasblom (1998) avoids this by using a CES utility function. This function,
however, has fewer parameters and is therefore not second order locally flexible
without parameter restrictions.
4 We experimented with different time endowments but this led to smaller values of
the likelihood.
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To determine net income as a function of working hours, the
following is required: net earnings; earnings of the partner; other
household income (child benefits, asset income); potential
unemployment assistance and other social security benefits. Income
of the partner and other household income are usually observed.
To determine net own earnings for each number of working hours,
we assume that the gross hourly wage rate does not depend on
hours worked (see Section 3.1). For workers with observed wage
rate, we can then compute net earnings for each possible number
of working hours. For non-workers, we need to predict the before
tax wage rate. For this purpose, we have estimated wage equations
for males and females, accounting for selection bias in the usual
way (see Heckman, 1979). The estimates of the wage equation are
then used to predict the wages of non-workers. Because the labour
supply model is non-linear in wages, it is necessary to take the
wage rate prediction errors into account for consistent estimation of
the labour supply model.
To determine social security benefits in case of working few or
zero hours, we incorporate the basic system of unemployment
assistance only. This is relatively easy to model: according to the
Dutch social security system, all families are entitled to financial
assistance if family income falls below the minimum standard of
living, which depends on age, marital status and family
composition (we - ignore the fact that these unemployment
assistance benefits are means tested). We do not model
unemployment insurance benefits. This is difficult to model due to
lack of data and due to the static nature of our framework -
unemployment insurance benefits are of a temporary nature.
Following van Soest (1995), the budget constraint under which the
individual maximises utility will be approximated by a finite
number of points. There is some discussion in the literature in how
to choose the number of points. Earlier studies such as Moffitt
(1986) and Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) have used only three
points for each individual (not .working, working full-time, and
working part-time). This has computational advantages. Moreover,
hours’ distributions are usually of a peaked nature, and using few
points might reduce the potential bias due to rounding errors made
by people reporting their hours of work. On the other hand, using
few points introduces rounding errors as well, since observed hours
are rounded off to one of the few points. More importantly for our
purposes, the more points are included, the more detail of the
budget set will be captured. This becomes particularly relevant if,
due to tax and benefits rules, the budget set is non-convex and
irregular. On the other hand, where irregularities in the budget sets
occur typically depends on income and not on hours. Due to
variation in wage rates, therefore, choosing fixed hours’ points may
lead to missing the irregularities for some people, but will include
them for others with different wages. Thus for the aggregate results,
working with very many points does not seem necessary. We,
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therefore, will work with more than just a few points, and analyse
the sensitivity of the results for the chosen number of points.
In the benchmark model, we take multiples of 6 hours and
work with 10 possible numbers of hours worked for each
individual: 0,6,...,54. For given hours of the partner, each choice of
h corresponds to some net family income yj (j=O,...,9), where j=0
corresponds to 0 hours, j=l corresponds to 6 hours, etc. In the
sensitivity analysis, we will also discuss results based upon hours
intervals of 4 or 8 hours.
The vectors appearing in the utility function are denoted by vs.’
vj = (logyjlog(80-6j),log(80-hp))~ (j = 0 .....9) (2)
where hp denotes given actual hours worked by the partner.
Maximising utility- for given actual hours of the partner-now boils
down to choosing the best point out of a set of ten points. First
order conditions etc. are not required; the choice is discrete.
3.3.3 ERROR TERMS
The utility function in (1) does not give room for an error term. We
introduce error terms as follows
u(vj) =U(vj)+ej (3)
We assume that the g. are iid and follow an extreme value
distribution. When he or she answers the desired hours’ question,
the individual is assumed to choose j ~ {0,...,9} such that u(vj) is
maximised. Due to the g, this is not always the same j for which
U(vj) is optimal. The ej can be interpreted as alternative specific
utilities, or as errors in evaluatin~ each alternative. They play a role
similar to the optimisation errors in the Hausman (1985) model. As
explained above, the empirical model we present does not allow
for random preferences. Incorporating random preferences by
adding an error term to the parameters of the utiliW function did
not improve the model significantly.
Due to the assumption on the distribution of the g, the resulting
model is very similar to the multinomial logit model. The
probability that an individual chooses alternative j, conditional on
the wage, potential benefits, exogenous variables, and the partner’s
number of hours worked, is given by
9
P[j] = exp{U(vj)}/ Y= exp{U(vk)} (j = 0 .....9) (4)k=O
P[j] increases with U(V/). Since U is increasing in income, the utility
of working increases with the (before and after tax) wage rate. On
the other hand, the utility of non-participation does not vary with
the wage rate. As a consequence, the participation probability
increases with the wage. On the other hand, the participation
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probability decreases with the benefits level: a higher benefits level
increases U(vo) but does not affect utility values of the alternatives
where working hours are so large that benefit income is zero.
3.3.4 FIXED COSTS OF WORKING
The model described so far appears to underpredict the number of
non-workers substantially. A possible explanation is that there are
fixed costs for working. In other words, there is an extra gain to
not working compared to all the other possibilities, which makes
not working relatively more attractive than working few hours per
week. The level of the fixed costs may depend on individual and
household characteristics Z. We model them loglinearly: log FCk =
Z’~Zk, k=2 (husband) and k=3 (wife).5 In computing the values of
the utility function, we now replace log Ys by log yj - log FC2 if
according to this alternative the husband works, by log Yl - log FC3
if only the wife works, and by log yj - log FC2 - log FC3 if, for
alternative j, both h>0 and hp>O. Since U is increasing with income,
positive fixed costs decrease the utility of working but do not affect
the utility of not working. They thus make working less attractive,
and decrease the probability of participation.
Fixed costs are not incorporated in van Soest (1995), who,
instead, uses disutilities of pa1*-time jobs to model the lack of part-
time jobs. The fixed costs approach is more in line with economic
models of labour supply. It was introduced earlier in this
framework by Euwals and van Soest (1999) and Callan and van
Soest (1996). Another possibility to explain the lack of part-time
jobs is to model the availability of part-time jobs using job offer
probabilities. This implies that the choice set varies across
households, with a common probability distribution for all
households in the sample. This approach is followed by Dickens
and Lundberg (1993), Woittiez and Tummers (1991), and van Soest
el al. (1990).
3.3.5 ESTIMATION
We estimate the model using all observations in the sample except
those who are not available for the labour market (NA, see Section
3.2). For those in voluntaw unemployment, desired hours are zero;
for those who work or are involuntarily unemployed, desired hours
are positive.
Due to the multinomial logit nature of the model, estimation by
maximum likelihood would be straightforward if all wages were
observed. As explained above, unobserved wages are replaced by
predictions. Prediction errors will be substantial and should
properly be taken into account. This can be achieved by integrating
out the disturbance term of the wage equation in the likelihood.
This, however, becomes computationally burdensome, particularly
5 We also added an unobserved heterogeneity term here, but (like random pr
eferences added to b2 and b) this did not significantly improve the model.
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if the wage of a working spouse is unobserved and the unknown
error term is bivariate. Instead, we approximate the integral by a
simulated mean. For each individual whose wage is unknown, we
take R draws from the distribution of the error term(s) in the wage
equation(s), and compute the average of the R likelihood values,
conditional upon the drawn error. This estimator is a special case
of smooth simulated maximum likelihood. It is asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood, provided that R tends to infinity
at a fast enough rate with the number of observations. See, for
instance, Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994). The results we present are
based upon R=10. In the sensitivity analysis, we also looked at R=5.
3.4
Results
The parameter estimates are shown in Table 3.2. The upper panel
refers to the terms in the utility function.~ An index m denotes the
husband and f denotes the wife. A positive coefficient on one of
the interactions with leisure (i.e. one of the ]5-s in be and b3 )
implies a positive effect on the marginal utility of leisure and thus a
negative effect on labour supply. For both spouses, age is
significant, and the age pattern of desired hours is decreasing,
particularly for older individuals. The presence of children has a
strong negative effect on the wife’s labour supply. For the husband,
however, the presence of older children significantly stimulates
labour supply. The presence of young children (aged 0-5) reduces
labour supply of both spouses significantly, though the effect is
stronger for women than for men.
Fixed costs of working depend on the presence of children and
on age and education level of husband and wife. Estimated fixed
costs appear to be positive for all individuals in the sample. For
women, fixed costs decrease significantly with education level. This
may suggest that fixed costs should be interpreted in a broad sense:
they may also reflect immaterial or psychological costs or benefits.
Women with high education level may find it rewarding to have a
(relatively attractive) job, which partly compensates their material
fixed costs. Still, also for the high educated women, fixed costs
remain significantly positive. For men, the education level pattern is
less clear: some educational dummies are significant, but the
pattern is not monotonic. While age of the woman does not change
her fixed costs significantly, fixed costs of men do increase with
age. As expected, fixed costs for females increase significantly if
there are young children. Surprisingly, however, the presence of
older children has the opposite effect, and is significant for both
men and women.
The coefficient of (log y)2 was insignificant and imprecise, and we therefore set it
to zero.
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results
Variable Estimation .... :
iog(8o - h~2
Iog(8Q- hf)"
log(y) log(80 ~ hrn)
log(y) log(80 - hf)
log(80 - hm)log(80 - hm)
log(y)
log(80 - hm)
log(80 - hm) Iog(agern)
log(80 - hm)Iog(agern)2
log(80 - hm) nchO-18
log(80 - hrn) d chO-5
log(80 - hf)log(80 - hf) Iog(agef)2
log(80 - hf) Iog(ageO
log(80 - hf) nch 0-18
log(80 - hf) d ch 0-5
-2.910
-3.174
0.845
-0.297"
0.832
4.457
83.658
-43.549
6.114
-0.255
0.663
121.933
-58.738
9,020
1.482
1.999
Fixed Costs - Men
Constant
Iog(agem)
nchO-18
d chO-5
d oPl2rn
d oPl3r~
d opl4m
d opl5rn
d opl6m
-1:308
0.421
-0.071
0.082
-0.148
-0.103
0.047
0.077
0.105
Fixed Costs - Women
Constant
log(age f)
nchO-18
d chO-5
d opl2f
d opl3f
d opl4f
d opl5f
d opl6f
0.008
0.047
-0.022
0.068
0.006
-0.052
-0.099
-0.196
0.028
3.4.1 ELASTICITIES
The estimates do not directly reveal the sensitivity of labour supply
for the wage rates. For this purpose, simulations are necessary to
compute elasticities. The elasticities vary across the sample. Since
we want to use the model for policy analysis, we are interested in
aggregate elasticities. We define the (own or cross) wage elasticity
of labour supply of some given group of people (husbands or
wives) as the percentage change in total desired hours of that
group if all before tax wage rates (of husbands or wives) in that
group rise by 1 per cent. Although this comes close to some
definitions used elsewhere, it is not the same. Many studies only
consider the elasticities for the average ("representative") family. In
a highly non-linear model like ours, these elasticities are not very
informative for the consequences of wage changes for a
heterogeneous population. Others consider average elasticities
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instead of elasticities of the average, thus giving more weight to
people with lower desired hours. Moreover, some people look at
elasticities of hours worked conditional upon participation. We take
full account of the (positive) impact of the wage rate on the
participation decision (with desired hours equal to zero for non-
participants). Actually, most of the sensitivity of labour supply for
wage rates is, according to our results, driven by changes in the
decision to participate. Finally, elasticity calculations vary with the
way in which the tax system is accounted for. We change all gross
wage rates by 1 per cent and leave the tax system unaffected. The
way in which net wage rates change is endogenous. On average,
they will change by slightly less than 1 per cent due to the
progressive nature of the tax rules.
For men, we find a positive own wage elasticity of 0.082. For
women, the estimate is 0.705. This is well in line with another
recent finding for the Netherlands of Vlasblom (1998), who finds an
elasticity of 0.59 for married women, using a similar methodology.
On the other hand, Grift (1998) finds much larger elasticities for
married women, with values between 2 and 3. She uses the same
data as Vlasblom (1998) but a very different type of model (a
censored regression model, with endogenous after tax wage rates
instrumented). Theeuwes (1988) already pointed at the vast range
of the empirical findings of labour supply elasticities for the
Netherlands, which is not out of line with findings in other
countries (see Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).
We find cross wage elasticities of -0.064 for men and -0.358 for
women. Thus, if all wage rates of both men and women would
rise, we would predict a very small positive change for labour
supply of men (0.082-0.064=0.018 per cent) and a positive change
of 0.347 per cent for women.
We have also looked at elasticities for several subpopulations.
Of particular interest from a policy point of view is labour supply
of the low educated women, since their participation rates are
lower and their unemployment rates are higher than for other
women. In general, we find that the supply of labour for the low
educated is more sensitive for wage rate changes than for the high
educated. For example, for low educated married women, we find
an own wage elasticity of 0.928, compared to 0.705 for the whole
population of married women. Their cross-wage elasticity is -0.430,
compared to -0.358 for all married women.
3.4.2 SENSITIVITY CHECK
We have checked the precision of our estimates in two different
ways. First, we have computed confidence intervals, maintaining
the assumption that the model is correctly specified. The
methodology is the same as in van Soest (1995): we have drawn
parameters from the estimated (normal) asymptotic distribution of
the estimator, and have computed the elasticities for a large
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number of drawn parameter vectors. This gives the estimated
distribution of the estimates of the elasticities.
For the own wage elasticities of all men and women, we find 90
per cent confidence intervals of [0.069;0.101] and [0.671;0.739],
respectively. For the cross wage elasticities, the intervals are [-
0.070; -0.061] and [-0.396; -0.319]. These results suggest that the
estimates are quite precise.
Second, we have re-estimated the model after changing certain
features of its specification. Of particular interest, for example, is
the robustness of the results for the number of points in the
discrete choice set. While the estimates in Table 3.2 are based upon
hours intervals of length 6 (h=0,6,...,54), we have also estimated the
model for 4 (h=0,...,56) and 8 (h=0,...,56) hours’ intervals. This has
some effect on the elasticities, but the effect is not dramatic. See
Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Results of theSensitivity Analysis
Parameters Parameters
in the in the
Estimation Simulation
Wage man
+ 10 per cent
IL=6,R=10 IL=6, R=10 0.82
IL=4,R=10 0.69
IL=8,R=10 0.90
IL=6,R=5 1.09
IL=6,R=10 IL=6,R=10 0.82
IL=4,R=10 1.01
IL=8,R=10 0.62
IL=6,R=5 0.83
Note:
1L = interval length.
IL = 4 means 11 is chosen from {0,4,8 .....56}
IL = 6 means 11 is chosen from {0,6,12 .....56}
IL = 8 means I1 is chosen from {0,8,16 .....56}
Men Women
Wage woman Wage man
+10 per cent + 10 per cent
-0:64 -3.58
-0.64 ,-3.21
-0,70 -3.92
-0.66 -4.26
-0.64 3.58
-0.67 -3.84
-0.62 ~-3,37
-0.63 ~3.51
Instead of changing the number of points in the choice set
during estimation, we have also looked at the same changes in the
simulations needed to compute the elasticities. Again, Table 3.3
shows that the elasticities do not change much. Moreover, we have
changed R, the number of draws per observation used in our
simulated maximum likelihood procedure, from 10 to 5. This affects
some of the elasticities, but again, not dramatically. It suggests that
R=10 is enough to get reasonably reliable estimates. All in all, we
can conclude that our results are reasonably robust for the
considered details of the specification. Still, the range of the
elasticities in Table 3.3 exceeds the confidence intervals for the
benchmark model reported above. This suggests that such
confidence intervals - which take the model specification as given
- tend to underestimate the uncertainty of the policy relevant
outcomes.
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3.5
Income Tax
Reforms
We first describe the main features of the current Dutch income
tax system for married couples (with or without children). The
exact numbers refer to 1998. Next, we discuss the main changes
proposed by the government. We do not discuss deductibles,
health insurance premiums, employee’s insurances, etc., since these
are not incorporated in our empirical model. We also do not
discuss rules for elderly people, retirement income, lone parents,
singles, etc., since this is irrelevant for the sample at hand.
3.5.1 ACTUAL INCOME TAX RULES
There is individual taxation for the two spouses: each spouse is
taxed for his or her own income. Since the revision in 1990, there
are four tax brackets, with marginal rates 0 per cent, 36.35 per
cent,7 50 per cent, and 60 per cent. The second and third bracket
are of fixed length (Dfl 47,000 and Dfl 56,000), the length of the
tax free bracket, however, depends upon earnings of the spouse. If
both spouses work and both earn more than Dfl 8,600, then the tax
free allowance for both is Dfl 8,600. If the wife has no own
income, the husband’s tax free allowance is Dfl 16,800, i.e., the
wife’s tax free allowance is largely transferred to the husband. If
the husband earns more than Dfl 8,600, but the wife earns less than
Dfl 8,600, the wife can (and, in general, will) transfer her
allowance to the husband, so that her own tax free allowance is Dfl
400 and her husband’s allowance will be Dfl 16,800. The same
rules apply if husband and wife are interchanged.
These rules for the tax free allowance give the income tax rules
some feature of a joint system. The transfer possibility creates a
disincentive for the woman to earn more than Dfl 8,600 if the
husbands earnings are high. This is revealed by the solid curves in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, which depict net family income as a function
of the wife’s hours of work. The before tax hourly wage rate of the
wife is set equal to 150 per cent of the nainimum wage rate. The
husband’s earnings are equal to the minimum wage for a full-time
worker (Figure 3.1) and 300 per cent of the minimum wage of a
full-time worker (Figure 3.2). The dip in both solid curves is
reached when the wife’s earnings attain the maximum transfer
threshold. The dip is more serious for the case where the husband’s
earnings are larger, since in that case the difference between the
wife’s and the husband’s marginal income tax rate is largest.
3.5.2 "TAXES IN THE 21s* CENTURY: AN EXPLORATIVE
ANALYSIS"
In the recent report "Taxes in the 21st Centuw: an Explorative
Analysis" (Ministw of Finance, 1997), the main ideas are sketched
for a complete reform of many features of the tax system. The main
proposals refer to increasing taxes on polluting activities, changing
7 This also includes premiums for national insurances.
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some of the VAT rates, and reducing taxes on labour. The latter
should mainly be achieved through a revision of the income tax
rules. The report contains 21 proposals for income tax revisions.
Many of these do not have far reaching consequences for marginal
tax rates on earnings. Some only involve small changes in marginal
rates or bracket lengths, and leave the system of tax free
allowances unaffectedff In some others, the tax free allowances are
replaced by tax cuts. 9 The third type of change in the proposal is
the most far reaching: tax free allowances for two earner families
are abolished,l° In all basic proposals, additional tax revenues are
used to lower the marginal tax rates, so that the revision as a whole
(also accounting for changes in other taxes) would be revenue
neutral. Apart from that, proposals are discussed in which tax
revenues are lowered, and the government thus reduces the tax
burden to stimulate the working of the labour market. In the
current paper, we will focus on the basic version of the second
type of change: replacing tax free allowances by tax cuts, with
adjustment of marginal tax rates. Such a type of revision is currently
proposed and will be discussed in parliament.
According to this proposal, the tax cut for the earner in a one
earner family would become Dfl 6,282. As soon as there is a
second earner, however, this would go down to Dfl 3,211, even if
the second earner has very low earnings. (The second earner
would also have a tax cut of Dfl. 3,211, at maximum.) Thus the
possibility of transfer for incomes below some positive threshold
disappears. This would change the disincentive to earn more than
Dfl 8,600 into a disincentive to earn anything at all, and might thus
discourage women with full-time working husbands from accepting
a job with only few hours per week.
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate this.11 The dotted lines in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 refer to the revised system. Figure 3.3 shows
the difference in net income between the revised and the actual
system on a more detailed scale, corresponding to both Figure 3.1
and 3.2. For full-time working women (with full-time working
husbands), the revision would be an improvement. This is in line
with the government’s intention that the revision should lower
taxes on labour. For women with a small part-time job, however,
the effect on household income would be negative.
We have checked in our sample, for how many two earners
families the reform would imply a negative incentive for the
woman to participate. We have computed the difference between
family income given actual hours of husband and wife, and family
income if the wife would stop working and the husband’s hours
s This holds for the proposals discussed in Option 1 in Ministry of Finance (1997).
’~ This is the basic version of Option 2 in Ministry of Finance (1997).
,0 This is the basic version of Option 3 in Ministry of Finance (1997).
’* The proposal also implies that the first tax band is extended by Dfl 5,000, while
the marginal tax rates for the three taxed income bands will be reduced to 34.1 per
cent, 43.9 per cent and 56.2 per cent.
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Figure 3.1 : After Tax Family Income as a Function of the Hours Worked by the Wife. The
Husband Earns the Minimum Wage
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Figure 3.2: After Tax Family Income as a Function of the Hours Worked by the Wife. The
Husband Earns Three Times the Minimum Wage
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would remain the same. This difference can be seen as the
marginal contribution of the wife to family income, reflecting the
financial incentive for the wife to participate. We have computed it
twice: according to the actual tax roles, and after the proposed
reform. For about 11 per cent of all two earners families, the
marginal contribution of the wife to family income would decrease.
As expected from Figure 3.3, this mainly concerns women with low
earnings who work part-time. This group also contains relatively
many women with low education levels and low hourly earnings.
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Of course the government is aware of this problem, and has
announced that it may be necessary to tackle this in some way.
Proposals for how to do so have not been worked out yet. One
purpose of our analysis is to analyse what the (negative) labour
supply effects would be if this problem is not tackled. In particular,
women with a small part-time job are overrepresented in the health
sector. Many women work about one day per week or less, helping
out in private households with elderly, ill, or handicapped people.
These women earn so little that they can transfer their tax free
allowance to their husband in the current system. The Ministry of
Health is concerned that many of these women will withdraw from
the labour market if the tax revision proposal is carried out.
Figure 3.3: Difference Between Family Incomes Based on Tax System as a Function of the
Hours Worked by the Wife
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3.6
The Tax
Reform and
Labour Supply
In this section we analyse the first order labour supply effects of
the tax reform proposal described above. Our structural model is
particularly well suited for this, since it accounts for the complete
structure of the tax system, including non-convexities like the kinks
in the current tax system in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Moreover, the
model predicts the effects on participation as well as the effects on
the distribution of hours worked.
The way in which the effects are predicted is very similar to the
method of computing the elasticities in Section 3.4. Using the
parameter estimates, we first predict labour supply using the actual
tax rules. We then repeat the simulation using the tax rules
according to the proposed refoffn. Comparing the two outcomes
gives the predicted changes. For the simulation after the reform, we
assume that before tax wage rates remain the same. Thus general
equilibrium effects are not taken into account: we consider the first
order effects only. Our results can in principle serve as input for a
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macro-economic general equilibrium type of model based upon
micro foundations.12
The results are presented in Table 3.4. The results for men are
in line with the intentions of the reform. Men usually work full-
time, and the reform is favourable for net earnings in full-time jobs.
Thus labour supply effects for married men are positive:
participation would rise by 0.20 per cent points, average desired
hours would rise by 0.58 per cent (from 38.40 to 38.62). Fewer
men would prefer a part-time job. However, all the effects for
married men are small.
For married women, the effects would be larger, corresponding
to women’s larger sensitivity for financial incentives (see Section
3.4). The percentage of women with partner preferring a part-time
job of less than 20 hours per week would fall from 32.05 per cent
to 31.54 per cent. This reflects the negative income effects for small
part-time jobs in Figure 3.3. About 1.29 per cent-points more
women would prefer a job of at least 20 hours per week. Together,
these two changes imply that participation would rise by 0.78 per
cent-points. Labour supply of married women measured in hours
would increase by about 3 per cent.
Table 3.4: Effects of the Tax Revision
Men
Participation (in per cenbpoints) 0.20
Average Hours (in per cent) 0:58
Women
0.78
3.01
3.7
Conclusions
Part-time, < 20 hours (in per cent-points)
-0.18
Part-time, > 20 hours (in.per cent-points)
-0.20
Full-Time (in percent:p0ints) ¯ 0.59
-0.51
0.72
0.57
Thus we conclude that the macro-economic effect on labour
supply will be positive, as is the intention of the government. But
the effects are not uniform for all workers, and for some groups,
negative effects are found. This implies that the reform may lead to
undesirable effects in some sectors of the labour market where
these groups are strongly represented, such as the health sector.
We have constructed a discrete choice structural labour supply
model which is able to capture important features of household
labour supply behaviour from a policy point of view: the model
accounts for the full structure of the tax roles; it simultaneously
12 An example of such a model in the Netherlands is MIMIC, which is one of the
main models used for policy analysis. See Gelauff and Graafland (1994).
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captures the participation decision and the decision on hours
worked, by allowing for fixed costs of work; it appropriately
accounts for missing information on wage rates; it does not impose
quasi-concavity of preferences and thus avoids the MaCurdy
critique that elasticities are largely determined a priori. We have
estimated the model using Dutch data and have obtained elasticities
which are well in line with other recent findings, and are robust for
changes in the specification. The usefulness of our approach is
illustrated by applying it to analyse the possible first order labour
supply effects of a recently proposed tax reform. Although this
reform would have a positive effect on total labour supply, it
would also imply a negative incentive for married women with a
part-time job, and would therefore reduce the number of women
who want to work less than 20 hours per week. This could have
distortionary effects on segments of the labour market where
women with a small part-time job are strongly represented, such as
a large part of the health sector.
Although we hope to have shown that our discrete choice
framework has clear advantages compared to the traditional neo-
classical static labour supply model, we cannot claim that it has no
limitations. These limitations are very similar to those of the
traditional model. First, the model is static and is not consistent
with a life cycle framework. It could be embedded in a life cycle
model with reliable data on consumption expenditures on savings,
but to make it a useful tool for policy analysis, it should then also
be enriched with a model explaining intertemporal substitution and
the impact of taxes on the marginal utility of life-time leisure. To
our knowledge, no attempt has yet been made to analyse the
impact of taxes in a complete life cycle framework. This seems an
enormous task requiring much better (paneD data than the data we
have used in the current paper.
Another limitation is the way in which we treat hours
restrictions and involuntary unemployment. Although considering
desired hours instead of actual hours can be seen as a step in the
right direction, it is far from the ideal model. A simultaneous
structural model for preferences and hours’ restrictions could be
seen as the ultimate goal. Again, however, we know of no study
which attains this goal, although a study like Ilmakunnas and
Pudney (1990) seems a promising step towards this.
Even within the static framework without demand side or
institutional restrictions, a more general framework could be
exploited. We have assumed joint utility maximisation of husband
and wife. A more general alternative is the bargaining framework
with separate utility functions for husband and wife, who then
attain some game theoretic equilibrium allocation (see Kooreman
and Kapteyn, 1990). Another way of extending the model is to
disaggregate what we call "leisure" into a number of different
categories of time allocation (see Apps and Rees, 1996). Similarly,
what we call consumption could be disaggregated in several
categories of commodities. Some work on these types of extensions
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has been done, and it has been shown that ignoring them can lead
to biased labour supply estimates, but using these models for
analysis of tax policies etc. still seems a hardly explored research
area. Provided that rich enough data become available, extending
the discrete choice framework in these directions could be a
promising direction of future research.
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4. TAXES, TRANSFERS AND
MBOUR MARKEr
RF£PONSES IN IRELAND:
WHERE DO WE Go FROM
HERE?
Tim Callan, Aedfn Doris and Brian Nolan
4.1
Introduction
The impact of taxes and transfers on labour market behaviour
has long been of concern to policy makers in Ireland as
elsewhere. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, this concern was
fuelled by veiT high levels of unemployment and continuing
outward migration. The macroeconomic environment is now veW
different. Total employment has risen rapidly, leading to a
combination of substantial falls in unemployment and sizeable
inward migration. Reductions in unemployment, and particularly
in long-term unemployment, remain a priority, but new concerns
about meeting emerging labour shortages have emerged more
recently. In this changed environment the size and nature of
labour market responses to tax and welfare policy changes
continues to be a pressing policy issue in the Irish context. Tax-
benefit simulation models incorporating behaviour have an
important contribution to make in analysing these responses and
framing policy, and the aim of this paper is to outline the current
Irish position in this regard and point to directions for
development.
By now, a significant body of international experience in the
estimation and simulation of labour market responses has been
accumulated. The other chapters in this volume deal with different
aspects of this experience, and provide aveW valuable base from
which new Irish work in this area can depart. Among the lessons
to be learned from this international experience we would
highlight the following:
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4.2
The SWITCH
Tax-Benefit
Model
¯ It is not possible to simply take a simulation model developed
elsewhere fi’om "off the peg", as it were, and apply it in
Ireland. Such a model has to be custom-built to a significant
extent, to fit with the data available and the policy context in
which one is operating.
¯ It is not sensible either to aim at one catch-all model taking
into account all the complexities of tax and welfare systems,
consistency across the life-cycle, family labour supply issues,
involuntary unemployment, take-up of welfare programmes,
and so on.
¯ As is so often the case, strategic simplifications have to be
made if the research strategy is to prove fruitful, reflecting
both the key questions on which the research decides to focus
and the available data
What we aim to do in this chapter is set out the context in
which these choices must be made, as one moves to the
estimation and simulation of labour supply responses in Ireland.
We describe in Section 4.2 the ESRI’s static tax/benefit simulation
model SWITCH, which provides an essential building-block
towards simulation incorporating behavioural responses. Section
4.3 outlines briefly the main findings from research on labour
supply behaviour in Ireland. In Section 4.4 we describe the main
features of the Irish policy context. Section 4.5 then outlines the
way forward and important strategic choices which have to be
made, ,and in conclusion Section 4.6 summarises our main themes.
It has long been clear that analysis of tax/welfare changes using
selected hypothetical cases has severe limitations. It cannot
provide an overall picture of the gains and losses associated with
reform packages and may miss some important effects: a small
number of selected households cannot adequately deal with the
diversity of circumstances relevant to the tax and welfare situation
of real households. Static tax-benefit models are thus needed to
assess the first-round effects of changes to tax and social welfare
policy, before behavioural responses are taken into account.
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model (the acronym stands for
Sinmlating Welfare and Income Tax Changes) has been developed
to allow such analysis to be carried out for Ireland. Being based
on a large-scale, nationally representative sample of actual
households, it automatically takes account of the wide diversity of
circumstances in the real population.
SWITCH is currently based on the Living in Ireland Survey, a
large-scale nationally representative survey of households
undertaken by the ESRI in 1994. The model database has been
adjusted in ways which ensure that it adequately reflects changes
in incomes, employment, unemployment and population since
then - and draws on projections of such changes as far ahead as
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2002 to provide a fl’ameworl~ for medium-term analysis of
budgetary issues. The model uses detailed information on
individual and family circumstances (including information on
wages and hours of work for those in paid employment, and on
labour force status and receipt of social welfare benefits for those
not in paid employmen0 to assess the social welfare entitlements
and tax liabilities of each family in the database. The model can
therefore simulate for each family the disposable income they
would receive under actual policy, or under alternative policies of
interest.
Using these detailed calculations it is possible to summarise the
impact of policy changes in many different ways - how the
average gain or loss varies depending on the income or
composition of the family, for example. The model has been used
to assess the static or first-round impact of various policy options
and of policy changes actually implemented in recent years.’ To
move beyond first-round effects to simulation of the dynamic
impact of policy changes, allowing for behavioural responses, one
needs evidence about the scale and nature of these responses. In
the next section we therefore briefly review what has been learned
from microeconometric analysis of labour supply responses in
Ireland.
4.3
Labour
Supply
Behaviour in
Ireland
A central feature of labour supply behaviour in Ireland in
comparative context is the relatively low rate of participation in
the paid labour force by married women, particularly those with
children. This has risen sharply in recent years but is still currently
below the levels found in many other European Union countries.
The other feature which would until recently have been to the fore
was a very high rate of unemployment compared with other EU
countries. Since 1994 unemployment has fallen very rapidly, but
ILO-based measures of unemployment have fallen more than
those based on a count of claimants for unemployment benefit or
assistance, and significant numbers remain on State employment-
creation schemes. The tax/welfare codes in combination continue
to face a significant minority of the unemployed with high
replacement rates, and tax rates facing married women can also be
particularly high because of the fact that (until Budget 2000) there
has been full transferability of personal allowances and rate bands
between spouses. The impact of the tax and welfare systems on
the labour supply behaviour of both married women and the
unemployed, and the effects of potential reforms to those systems,
thus remain of enormous interest.
’ For example, Keamey (ed.) (1999) examine d~e impact of tax and welfare policy
changes over the 1987 to 1994 period on the income distribution and on work
incentives. The analysis in Callan (ed.) (1998) and Kearney (ed.) (1999) points to
the need for greater attention to the mechanisms used to uprate welfare payments,
if the long-run goals of the National Anti-Poverty Strategy are to be met.
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Early studies on this topic include Walsh and Whelan (1976).
This study used data gathered in a special survey on women and
employment in Ireland, and estimated linear probability models of
employment versus non-employment for single and married (non-
farm) women. The results suggested that for married women, the
presence of children under four years of age, the lack of a third
level education, and having a husband in a professional
occupation all reduced the probability of employment. The study
did not have reliable data on wages and non-employment income,
and so could not estimate their impact on participation.
The large-scale household survey carried out by the ESRI in
1987 was one of the first to provide the type of microdata required
for the analysis of labour supply for a representative sample of the
population as a whole. Analyses using that survey, including
Callan and Farrell (1991), Callan and Van Soest (1996), and Doris
(1998), have provided useful insights into labour supply decisions,
as have Murphy and Walsh (1996) using Labour Force Survey data.
Callan and Farrell (1991) analysed the labour supply of married
women. Their analysis incorporated models both of female
participation2 and of hours of work, and variables such as
industW- and occupation-level unemployment rates were included
to account for demand-side constraints in the labour market. The
results showed a high wage elasticity of participation for Irish
married women, of 2.7. The corresponding figure for men,
estimated for the purpose of comparison, was positive but small at
only 0.1-0.2. The results for the responsiveness of married
women’s hours of work, for those who were in paid employment,
depended on the model used, but a small negative elasticity was
regarded as the most reliable. Participation rates for those with
children tended to be lower, even after controlling for other
influences, but those women who were in paid employment and
had young children tended to have somewhat higher hours of
work.-The analysis did not attempt to model in detail the impact
of tax and welfare structures on the budget constraints facing
individuals.
Doris (1998) also used the 1987 ESRI data to look at the labour
supply behaviour of Irish married women, focusing on the choice
between part-time work and full-time work and estimating two
models. One models the choice between full-time and part-time
work as a binomial one, where the choice is conditional on
participation. (This is equivalent to a double-hurdle model, with
independence between the participation and part-time/full-time
decisions.) The second is a multinomial logit model of the choice
made between four hours of work ranges and non-participation.
The results show that own wage, husband’s income, the number
and ages of children, labour market experience and some
" These participation models were estimated both with and without a wage
variable; where a wage variable was included, missing wages were predicted using
Heckman’s method for correcting for sample selection bias.
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occupational variables are the main determinants of the choice of
hours range. Children have a stronger negative effect on the
probability of working full-time than part-time.
Murphy and Walsh (1996) focus on male labour supply, using
micro data from the 1993 Labour Force Survey. The distinction
between non-participation and unemployment is emphasised, and
non-employment, unemployment and non-participation are each
modelled as probit equations. The results suggest that living in
urban areas increases the probability of both unemployment and
non-participation. Age increases the probability of unemployment,
but the probability of non-participation decreases up to the late
thirties and increases beyond this age. Married men are less likely
to be non-participants and more likely to be unemployed. Men
with more than five children are more likely to unemployed,
higher levels of education reduce the probability of non-
employment, and home ownership and renting in the private
sector reduce the probability of non-employment. Since the
Labour Force Survey does not include information on income, the
direct influence of financial incentives could not be examined.
Callan and van Soest (1996) was the first study to look at
labour supply responses for Ireland in the broad estimation and
simulation framework on which this volume is focusing. It
represented an adaptation of the basic van Soest (1995) model of
family labour supply where the endogeneity of partners’ labour
supply decisions is taken into account. This basic model was
extended to deal with involuntaW unemployment through a
double hurdle model, and to incorporate fixed costs of working.
Using the 1987 ESRI data once again, aggregate own wage
elasticities for women were found to be about 0.67, with the
corresponding elasticity for men being 0.15. The participation
elasticity for women is similar to the aggregate own wage
elasticity.
This model was used to simulate the effect of a move from the
1987 Irish income tax system of "income-splitting" or fully
transferable allowances between spouses to a system of fully
independent taxation, in order to assess the maximum impact of a
change in the tax treatment of couples. It was found that, on a
revenue-neutral basis,3 this change could lead to a rise in the
employment rate of married women of close to 4 percentage
points, with a negligible aggregate effect on male labour supply. A
more limited change, retaining transferability of unused
allowances, but removing transferability of rate bands, was also
considered. This was estimated as leading to a rise in the married
women’s participation rate of about 1 percentage point. These
results can be compared with the rise in the participation rate of
married women from about 17 per cent in 1980 to around 45 per
cent at present.
More precisely, the change was designed to be revenue neutral in the absence of
behavioural changes.
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Some initial work exploring labour supply issues has also been
undertaken with more recent data. Callan and Doris (1999) use a
more recent dataset, fi’om the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, to
analyse participation decisions by Irish men and women via
estimation of probit models. (The focus of this work was on the
impact of the proposed national minimum wage, but the findings
are also of more general interest.) Table 4.1 summarises the key
results from the study, in terms of estimated elasticities of
participation. These elasticities tell us the proportionate change in
the participation rate that could be expected from a I percentage
point rise in wage rates.
Table 4.i: Estimated Elasticities of Participation with Respect to the Wage Rate
All              Men Single Married All =
Women Women ~ Women
0.46 0.42 0.36 0.70 0.54
Source: Callan and Doris, 1999, Table 4.4.
Elasticities of participation are similar for men and for single
women, but the highest responsiveness is still found among
married women. The results suggest that the wage elasticity of
participation of married women may have fallen significantly
between 1987 and 1994. Further investigation is needed on this
issue, but the rise in participation between 1987 to 1994 may itself
be a part of the explanation. The results for men show a greater
elasticity of participation than is usually found, as a result of
allowing the effect to vary with education levels. Men with low
levels of education were found to have very high wage elasticities,
indicating that many of those classed as "not seeking work" would
enter employment if the wage rate were sufficiently high. Men
with second-level qualifications or higher, by contrast, are found
to be relatively unresponsive to the wage rate, as they were likely
to be in employment in any event.
These studies, while limited in number, nonetheless provide a
point of departure for the analysis of tax and welfare changes in
Ireland through simulation. We return below to the ways in which
this evidence needs to be expanded, having first looked at the
current policy context in which tax/transfer effects are being
addressed in Ireland.
4.4
The Irish
Policy Context
The core aim of the social welfare system, and of the tax system
insofar as it interacts with it, is to provide a safety-net replacement
income support for those without employment, while maintaining
a financial incentive for them to become employed rather than
remain dependent on welfare. This tension between providing an
adequate level of support and maintaining work incentives has of
course been recognised for as long as there has been organised
income support. One therefore sees what are at root veW much
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the same issues resurface under different guises in different
societies and at different points in time. In the Irish case, concern
in the 1980s and into the 1990s focused primarily on
unemployment and replacement rates, both in terms of the
evolution of welfare levels vis-a-vis wages and the taxes levied on
those on low earnings. High marginal income tax rates were also
seen as contributing to continuing outward migration (and
perhaps, with hindsight, to tax evasion). In the very different
macroeconomic situation at the end of the 1990s, unemployment
has fallen to low levels and substantial return migration has
occurred. In this very different environment the nature of the tax
and welfare policy reforms being debated has changed a good
deal, but the importance of knowing how labour market
behaviour is likely to respond to policy changes remains.
The specific areas on which attention has been focused may be
briefly outlined. The first, which has also featured prominently in
policy debates elsewhere in Europe, is the level and structure of
direct taxes on labour through income taxes and social insurance.
For about a decade efforts have been made to reduce marginal tax
rates, and more recently an emphasis on reducing the taxes levied
at low earnings levels has emerged. The proportion of earners
paying at the top marginal tax rate remains very high, however,
partly because the nettle of indexation of the parameters of the
income tax system has not been fully grasped. Attempts to remove
low-income families from the tax net via increasing exemption
limits resulted in very high marginal rates for those just above the
limits and this strategy is now in abeyance. A decision to move
towards a system of tax credits, starting from 1999, marks a major
structural reform. Reforms of the social insurance system have also
attempted to reduce the burden on the low paid, though once
again the result has exacerbated poverty traps for those in the
region above the specified cut-offs.
The level and structure of unemployment compensation
through weekly social welfare payments had been a major focus
of attention, though with unemployment declining so rapidly this
has receded somewhat. As gross earnings levels have accelerated,
the gap between unemployment support and average or lower
pay levels has widened without any need for the former to be
reduced - indeed, income support levels have been increasing
significantly ahead of prices. In addition, the scale of income tax
reductions made possible by economic growth has widened the
gap between net pay and income support even more. Further,
additional payments for children of those depending on
unemployment compensation have been frozen as resources have
been channelled into universal Child Benefit - to which we return
below - so replacement rates for those with families have also
been pulled back. For all these reasons, concern about financial
incentives facing the unemployed is now focused more on means-
tested support other than the standard weekly payment, and on
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specific issues relating to housing and childcare, to which we
return shot*ly.
The treatment of couples by the tax and social welfare systems
is an issue that has received some attention and is likely to assume
increasing prominence. The social welfare system currently makes’
a payment for the "qualified adult" in a couple which is lower than
that for a single adult, and pressures - both internal and at EU
level - to move towards individualisation seem likely to grow.4 As
far as income tax is concerned, the system introduced in 1980 is at
one extreme of an international spectrum in making available to
married couples double the tax allowances and bands applicable
to a single person. This contributes to the situation where single
people and each earner in a two earner married couple face the
top rate of tax at incomes close to the average industrial wage.
The Budget for 2000, set out in December 1999, announced a
three-year strategy for the individualisation of tax bands, to be
phased in over three years, designed in part to deal with this issue.
One by-product of greater independence in the taxation
treatment of couples would be that resources intended to benefit
children could be channelled more directlv through child benefit.
The best way to assist families with children, particularly those on
low incomes, has become entangled in recent policy debates with
the thorny issue of childcare - the latter being an increasingly
high-profile issue as more and more married women enter or
remain in the paid labour force. Very different strategies have their
fervent advocates, ranging from tax breaks, universal or targeted
transfers to families, subsidies to childcare providers, and direct
State provision, and a coherent approach by the State has yet to
emerge.
Childcare issues 100111 particularly large for lone parents, and as
the number of lone parents continues to grow various changes in
state income support to this group have been implemented, with
the aim of preventing long-term detachment from the labour
market. More generally, the Family Income Supplement scheme
for low-income employees with dependent children has also been
amended and expanded on various occasions over the last decade
to improve the incentive for this group to take up employment.
Most recently, the basis for assessment of the level of payment to
be received under the scheme, if any, has been changed from
gross earnings to earnings after tax and social insurance
contributions. No steps have been taken as yet to move towards
administration of this scheme through the income tax system
rather than as direct transfers, as has happened in the UK, but this
may become an issue in the future. Concerns about the relatively
low level of take-up of this benefit remain.
4 Budget 2000 announced that payment rates for qualified adults were to be raised
from 60 per cent of the single adult rate to 70 per cent of that rate over a three year
period.
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4.5
Where Do We
Go From
Here?
In addition to childcare, the major concerns currently being
articulated about disincentive effects facing the unemployed or
low earners relate to support for the cost of housing and health
care. State support for housing costs primarily comes through
direct cash payments to those relying on social welfare for their
weekly income, and the below-market rents charged by local
authorities to low-income households living in public sector
housing. As far as medical care is concerned, about the bottom
one-third of the population has entitlement to full free medical
care on a means-tested basis, with those above this income ceiling
having to pay for their general practitioner and prescribed
medicines, as well as some charges for hospital care. Both these
forms of State support can contribute to actual or perceived
disincentives in going from unemployment into a job or increasing
earnings levels when employed. As a result, special provision has
been made in recent years to ensure that someone going from
long-term employment into employment retains full entitlement to
free health-care for a period of years. The way in which families
receive support for housing costs is however a growing concern as
these costs rise rapidly and those in employment are seen to be
disadvantaged compared with the unemployed, and this is an area
where reforms appear inevitable)
Against this background, what are the major gaps in knowledge
about labour market responses to tax and welfare changes, and
what is the best direction in which to develop analysis? The
studies described in Section 4.3, together with the static
microsimulation model described in Section 4.2, provide a point of
departure for the analysis of tax and welfare changes in Ireland
through simulation, but so far some important sub-groups have
not been studied in depth. As well as investigating the responses
of prime-aged males and married women in greater depth, much
more needs to be learned about the responsiveness of lone
parents to financial incentives, and there is little or no Irish
evidence about the sensitivity of the timing of retirement to such
incentives. Another serious gap is microeconometric analysis of
the responsiveness of migrants to economic conditions (notably
unemployment rates and net wages) in Ireland versus elsewhere.
Given such a body of evidence about labour market responses
of the various sub-groups of interest, the next priority is to be able
to simulate responses to changes of interest in tax and welfare
policy. The availability of suitable micro-data is a critical constraint
on both estimation and simulation, but the Irish situation in that
regard is improving. As mentioned earlier, cross-section data from
the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, with adjustments for more
Budget 2000 announced that "tapering" arrangements (i.e., a system under which
benefit is reduced rather than immediately withdrawn) would apply to those
returning to work, as well as to those attending training courses or in part-time
work.
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recent developments using external information, is currently the
basis for the static ESRI microsimulation model SWITCH. The
Living in Ireland Survey has in fact been gathering panel data
annually since 1994, which will open up the possibility of other
estimation approaches exploiting the information on individual
transitions over time. Data from the Household Budget Surveys
carried out by the Central Statistics Office are also now released to
researchers in the form of micro-data, with 1987 and 1994
currently available and a new budget survey being carried out in
1999/2000. The micro-data from what was the annual Labour
Force Survey, now the Quarterly National Household Survey, is
also now made available by the CSO, and in all these ways the
available information on which analysts can draw has expanded
considerably.
What then are key elements involved in developing the
capacity to analyse tax/welfare changes through microsimulation
incorporating behavioural responses? The first requirement is a
micro-dataset with detailed information on labour market status,
incomes from various sources, and demographic composition for a
representative sample of h’ish households. The second is a static
microsimulation model with the capacity to simulate disposable
income under alternative choices of hours for the current structure
of tax and welfare, so that budget constraints can be modelled in
sufficient detail to allow estimation of behavioural responses.
Finally, given estimates of behavioural responses, one must then
be able to simulate disposable incomes under alternative choices
regarding employment and hours of work, for alternative policies.
While significant elements of the foundations for such a
development are already in place, some important strategic
choices must also be made at this point. The first is whether to
model budget constraints as discrete versus continuous: does one
seek to model labour supply choices along the entire spectrum of
hours, or in discrete ranges? This choice in fact appears fairly
straightforward at this stage, as a practical matter. While there is,
of course, some loss of accuracy in characterising the budget
constraint and hours options in terms of discrete packages, this
approach allows much greater flexibility in a number of other key
areas and is the one we intend to adopt.
A second choice which has to be made is how best to
approach the individual versus familial nature of labour supply
decisions. One option is to focus on individual labour supply
decisions, with the income and hours worked of the spouse or
preener taken as fixed. Another is to treat decisions about the
labour supply of both partners as jointly produced by a unitary
decision-making entity. Finally, one can explore What
bargaining/collective choice approaches have to say about how
such decisions are actually reached. Given that some of the key
tax and welfare issues concern the treatment of couples, a family
labour supply framework may represent the best compromise
here. This does not make the restrictive assumption that husbands
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make decisions taking their wife’s labour supply as fixed and vice
versa, but assumes the couple as a unit decide how to adjust their
individual supply of labour.
The treatment of unemployment in labour supply models also
raises complex choices. Some econometric approaches treat all
unemployment as similar to non-participation; others adopt a more
nuanced approach, treating those classified under ILO guidelines
as "seeking work" as involuntarily unemployed. The best approach
may depend in part on the available data. A new development in
the Irish context is that the ESRI’s 1994 Living in Ireland Sulwey
contains information on desired hours of work for those currently
in employment, as well as information on whether individuals
who are currently not in employment are seeking work. More
detailed work on unemployment duration, and its relationship to
the balance between in-work and out-of-work income, would also
be of interest.
4.6
Conclusions
Reform of the tax and social welfare systems continues to be a
pressing policy issue in the h’ish context. The ESRI’s tax/benefit
model SWITCH provides a basis for monitoring the incentives
produced by the tax/welfare system for different individuals and
families and how that is changing over time. To assess the
dynamic impact of policy changes, however, the behavioural
responses of different individual and households to such changes
must also be taken into account. This requires robust and reliable
evidence on key aspects of the different dimensions of labour
supply decisions, such as choosing whether to enter the labour
force and choices between part-time and full-time work. In
particular, it is necessary to derive estimates of labour supply
responsiveness which take into account the financial choices
which the current tax and welfare system actually offers to a wide
range of participants and potential participants in the labour
market. This requires an estimation procedure which is linked to
the sorts of calculations undertaken by static tax-benefit models.
Although a simulation model developed elsewhere cannot
simply be taken and applied in Ireland, experience elsewhere in
working towards this type of dynamic simulation is extremely
instructive. It suggests, inter alia, it is not sensible to aim at one
catch-all model taking into account all the complexities of tax and
welfare systems, consistency across the life-cycle, family labour
supply issues, involuntary unemployment, take-up of welfare
programmes, and so on. Strategic simplifications have to be made
if the research strategy is to prove fruitful, reflecting both the
central questions on which the research is focusing and the
available data. In this chapter some of the key choices involved
and directions to be explored in future research have been
outlined. Given the foundations already in place, further progress
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towards simulation incorporating some key behavioural responses
can be made.
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